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INTRODUCTION

The legal landscape has changed significantly since Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA" or "the Act"). Even
though Congress amended the Act in 2006, these amendments have
done little to address the new obstacles faced by minority communities
who seek to expand their electoral opportunities.' Some of these
obstacles are political, as partisan forces have often manipulated the
Act for electoral gain, 2 but the greatest obstructions have been
judicial. The Supreme Court has strongly implied that Congress might
violate principles of federalism by requiring states to preclear their
redistricting plans with the Department of Justice; 3 has held that
states are not required to maximize electoral opportunities for
minority voters;4 and has deferred to the states in the face of5
conflicting federal and state statutory mandates over redistricting.
1.
See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 58081 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
2.
See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Gov. Rick Scott Stalls New Voter-Approved Redistricting
Standards,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politicsl
gubernatorialgov-rick-scott-stalls-new-voter-approved-redistricting-standards/1147578
(stating that Governor Scott withdrew Florida's request for section 5 preclearance of voterapproved ballot initiatives that would require nonpartisan standards to be instituted for
legislative redistricting).
Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO v. Holder), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511
3.
(2009).
4.
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2009).
5.
Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 428 (2009).
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These decisions and others have rendered the once successful VRA 6
legally impotent to address the new challenges faced by minority
7
voters and have called its constitutionality into question.
The inconsistency between the Act as written and the Act as
implemented surfaces because the Supreme Court presumes that the
states' authority over elections is sovereign. The Elections Clause
gives states the ability to choose the "time, place, and manner" of
elections but reserves to Congress the power to veto state electoral
schemes. As evident from the text, the states have autonomy, defined
here as the ability to make policy in the absence of congressional
action, over their electoral mechanisms. 8 In contrast, the states lack
true sovereignty-or final policymaking authority-over elections
because Congress can veto state action. The Elections Clause has, in
effect, its own Supremacy Clause that emphasizes the primacy of
federal law. 9
As the constitutional text and history show, the Elections
Clause has less to do with federalism, as that term is typically
understood, 10 and more to do with providing an organizational
structure that gives the states broad power to construct their electoral
systems while retaining final policymaking authority for Congress.
The Elections Clause, when combined with Congress's ability to

6.

STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, THE LAW IS GOOD: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, REDISTRICTING,

AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS, at ix (2010) ("In 1964, there were only about 300 black elected
officials in the U.S. Today there are over 9,000 .... The number of Asian Americans has tripled
in recent years, and in large part due to the VRA, more than 6,000 Latinos now serve in elected
or appointive office.").
7.
See Michael Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV.
903, 905 (2008) (describing current VRA enforcement as an "Era of Maintenance" because of
judicial refusal to maximize minority opportunities and instead focus on maintaining minority
political strength at its current levels).
8.
The Elections Clause provides that "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
9.
See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 386 (1880) ("[I]n the case of laws for regulating the
elections of representatives to Congress, the State may make regulations on the subject;
Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made.
The paramount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by
the State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther. There is no such conflict between
them as to prevent their forming a harmonious system perfectly capable of being administered
and carried out as such.").
10. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC
COMPROMISE 20 (2008) ("[F]ederalism grants subunits of government a final say in certain areas
of governance .... ). Of course, this is not the only definition of federalism. See S. RUFUS DAVIS,
THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST OF A MEANING (1978) (providing
an analysis of the meanings of federalism over time).
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enforce the mandates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,11
provides ample constitutional justification for the VRA. The Act
represents an appropriate use of congressional power to alter or
modify state electoral schemes that govern federal elections and
implicate the constitutional right to vote. 12 Moreover, since the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments changed the balance of
federalism in our system, at best the states retain a limited
sovereignty over state practices that do not run afoul of these
13
provisions.
Contrary to these principles, the Court continues to defer to
state sovereignty in this area because states have plenary authority
over elections pursuant to the Elections Clause, even though Congress
can intervene if it so chooses. Since Congress's "make or alter"
authority has been used sparingly, first because of federalism
concerns and later because the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments did most of the work of regulating state electoral
practices, the Court has ignored that the Clause, by its very terms,
deprives states of final policymaking authority over elections. Thus,
the Court's decisions that narrow the scope of the VRA on the grounds
of "state sovereignty" mischaracterize the historical and textual
relationship between the states and the federal government over the
matter of elections. As a result of this misunderstanding, the Court
has been overly critical of federal legislation that alters or modifies
state electoral laws.

11. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees each citizen "equal protection of the laws" and
the Fifteen Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce, "by appropriate legislation," the
right of citizens to vote without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U.S.
CONST. amends. XIV & XV.
12. The theory of interpretation articulated here is loosely based on "intratextualism," a
method of constitutional interpretation in which the Constitution is read holistically by
comparing and contrasting identical words or phrases in different parts of the document. Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). The Elections Clause and the
Fifteenth Amendment both pertain to voting and elections, but my analysis includes the
Fourteenth Amendment, which has also been interpreted as a constraint on state authority over
elections. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (finding that the right to
vote is a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87-101 (1980) (rejecting a narrow,
clause -bound interpretation of various provisions of the Constitution).
13. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 226 (2000) (noting that the states' power over elections "has
been eradicated by five constitutional amendments (Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments), federal
voting rights legislation, and the Supreme Court's Equal Protection cases. It is, in fact,
impossible to think of anything a state could do to protect itself with this power today that would
not be either unlawful or ineffective.") (internal citations omitted).
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The legal scholarship has largely ignored the Court's conflation
of sovereignty with autonomy because the theory of dual federalismthe idea that each level of government has a mutually exclusive
regulatory sphere14-does not require the Court to define what it
means for an entity to be sovereign. 1 Rather, the Court has focused on
the scope of the entity's policymaking area, which has allowed the
Court to define sovereignty by negative implication.1 6 As a result, the
boundaries of the "residual sovereignty" that the Constitution reserves
to the states are unclear,17 and the Court has been able to bypass
these definitional constraints by viewing state sovereignty as
concurrent with that of the federal government, even if there is no
principled justification for that conclusion. 18
14. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1468 (2001) ("Article VI explicitly recognizes that
state judges will engage in some type of judicial review, for they are commanded to set aside
state law that comes into conflict with federal law. In the course of this task, state judges first
must ask whether a federal statute, with which state law conflicts, itself is consistent with the
Constitution. If a state law conflicts with a federal law but the federal law itself is
unconstitutional, then the state court may be under no Article VI obligation to invalidate the
state law.").
15. See, e.g., Roderick Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 938 (1998) ("The
Court has relied either on palpably untrue statements that the federal and state governments
operate in separate, independent, and mutually exclusive spheres or on conclusory assertions
that commandeering legislation deprives states of sovereignty.").
16. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 200-01 (1824) ("[T]hat a State might impose
duties on exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden, will be conceded; but that it follows as
a consequence, from this concession, that a State may regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the States, cannot be admitted."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964)
(quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195) ("The activities that are beyond the reach of Congress are
'those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purposes of executing some of the general powers of
government.' "); see also Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 125, 139 ("Since the start, or shortly after the start, the scope of Congress's
commerce power has been defined by negative implication from what Chief Justice Marshall said
it was not.") (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195).
17. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot commandeer state officials without undermining residual state sovereignty). Printz, like
the early federalism cases, defines residual sovereignty by negative implication. Id. at 918-19
(stating that residual sovereignty is "reflected throughout the Constitution's text" including in
the Judicial Power Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Guarantee Clause; it
is "also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral of Congress upon not all governmental
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones").
18. Id. at 918 ("It is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of 'dual
sovereignty.' "); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("We have always
understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1991) ("One fairly can dispute
whether our federalist system has been quite as successful in checking government abuse as
Hamilton promised, but there is no doubt about the design. If this 'double security' is to be
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Regardless of which defmition of sovereignty one endorses,
however, all theories require that the political entity in question have
final policymaking authority in a defined area in order to command
the respect of both its citizens and the central authority. 19 For this
reason, dual federalism does not tell us much about the Elections
Clause because both levels of government are involved in regulating
elections. Even cooperative federalism, in which policymaking
authority is shared, does not provide an adequate theoretical
foundation for the Elections Clause. The text explicitly rejects the
notion of shared power by depriving the states of final authority and
allowing for the possibility of federal preemption.
In any case, the scholarly and judicial preoccupation with state,
as opposed to congressional, sovereignty has had significant
implications for the VRA. Because of this presumption that the states
are sovereign over elections, the Supreme Court has employed a
"federalism norm" that has undermined the effectiveness of the Act,
and in particular, section 5. 20 The federalism norm is a nontextual,
free-floating conception of the federal/state balance of power that the
Court uses to "restore" the original balance of power between the
states and the federal government. Besides the fact that the norm is
pro state sovereignty and disregards the significant federal authority
in this area, the Court ignores that the original balance is an elusive
and arbitrary concept. Indeed, it is impossible for the Court to allocate
regulatory authority over elections in a way that does not make the
Court itself appear political.
By focusing on "sovereignty" as the defining principle of the
Elections Clause and using evidence from the constitutional text and
effective, there must be a proper balance between the States and the Federal Government. These
twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible."); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455, 458 (1990) ("[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that
of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.").
19. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 342; see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198 (1967) (noting that sovereignty is

based on the notion that "there must reside somewhere in every political unit a single,
undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law, a law
unto itself'); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (1961) (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
("The idea of a national Government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual
citizens; but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of
lawful Government."); Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
'Sovereignty'inNational League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1976).
20. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (requiring certain covered states
and political subdivisions to get preclearance from the federal government if they "shall seek to
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting" in order to ensure
that none "has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color").
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history, this Article fills a gap in the literature. While there has been
some debate over how federalism affects election law,2 1 there has not
been a sustained treatment of the implications of the Elections
Clause's allocation of power between the states and the federal
government for the Court's VRA jurisprudence. This may be because
many scholars reject sovereignty as a basis for understanding our
system of federalism. 22 But sovereignty, I argue, plays an important
role in understanding the scope of congressional power to regulate
state electoral mechanisms. Although Congress usually intervenes in
state electoral practices pursuant to its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Elections Clause serves
as the baseline for the relationship between Congress and the states
with respect to elections. And since the Elections Clause gives
Congress final policymaking authority over federal elections and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments extend this authority to state
elections, any judicially enforced federalism norm in favor of state
power is illegitimate. These factors require the Court to employ
rational basis review of the legislative record of the VRA for any
challenges going forward.
Part L.A of this Article reviews the scholarly literature, which
is bereft of any discussion of how the Elections Clause, and its
allocation of power, should affect judicial interpretations of the VRA.
Part I.B focuses on several federalism theories that can explain the
allocation of power in the Elections Clause, concluding that all are
inadequate because they do not properly consider the role of
sovereignty in their analyses. Part II surveys the constitutional
history, text, and the Court's case law on the Elections Clause as well
as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. This Part argues that
the states knew that they were surrendering their sovereign authority
over elections by ratifying the Constitution. Based on this premise,
Part III presents a new theoretical framework for the Elections
Clause. Part III.A argues that the Elections Clause gives the states
autonomy, or broad authority, over the matter of elections as part of a
21. See, e.g., Kareem U. Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance,44 IND. L. REV.
201, 230-40 (2010) (inventing a new framework for section 5 preclearance that addresses
federalism concerns); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the ParadoxicalCase of the Voting
Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 719 (2009) (discussing judicial interpretation of VRA and
the rejection of federalism arguments); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (2010); Franita Tolson, PartisanGerrymanderingas a Safeguard
of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 908-09.
22. See infra Part I.B.2. (discussing process theorists who reject an account of federalism
that centers around sovereignty); see also Gerken, supra note 21, at 6 ("Academics argue that
sovereignty is in short supply in 'Our Federalism.' They insist that the formal protections
sovereignty affords are unnecessary for achieving federalism's ends.").
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decentralized organizational structure that requires the Court to defer
to Congress when it exercises its authority over elections.
Decentralization, not federalism, best describes our electoral system,
where states are autonomous rather than sovereign and where they
may be immune from certain federal norms but are not exempt from
23
all federal government intervention.
As such, the federalism norm, discussed in Part III.B, is
illegitimate because it elevates state over federal authority. The norm
is a way to reallocate power between the federal government and the
states outside of the legislative process, but it inappropriately
prioritizes state sovereignty over Congress's authority to act in this
area. This Article, which is both descriptive and normative, aims to fill
a gap in the literature by showing how the states' authority under the
Elections Clause, although extensive, is not sovereign. As such,
abandoning the federalism norm in this context will result in a more
faithful interpretation of the VRA and of our system of federalism as a
whole. The Court's conflation of "sovereignty" and "autonomy" in its
voting-rights jurisprudence and its perception that the Clause is about
federalism as opposed to simply decentralization has resulted in an illconceived and misplaced deference to state authorities over the matter
of elections.
I. DEFINING THE STATES' POWER OVER ELECTIONS: ELECTION LAW
MEETS FEDERALISM THEORY
A. The Voting Rights Act as a Justified Intrusionon State Sovereignty:
The Scholarly Literature
Congress renewed the VRA in 2006 for another twenty-five
years, but the Act continues to generate significant controversy among
scholars and the courts. Its two most successful provisions-section 2
and section 5-have received particular attention because these
provisions have eradicated much of the racial discrimination in voting,
but at a significant cost to the states. Section 2 forbids any "standard,
practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgment of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color" and operates nationwide. 24 The Court has interpreted section 2
to reach claims of vote dilution, where a sizable group of minority
voters is denied the opportunity to elect the candidate of its choice

23.

See generally FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 20-21.

24.

42 U.S.C.

§ 1973(a)

(2011).
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because its vote is submerged in a district where residents vote along
25
racial lines.
In contrast, section 5 is a remedial measure that covers only
those areas that engaged in the most blatant discrimination in voting
at the time of the Act's passage, all of which are in the Deep South.
Section 5 suspends all changes in state election procedure until a
three-judge federal district court in Washington, D.C., or the U.S.
Attorney General approves the changes. The preclearance provision
was designed to ensure nonretrogression in minority voter registration
or, in other words, to prevent minorities from being worse off under
26
the new voting provision than they were under the previous plan.
For many years, minority groups effectively used section 2 to
increase their political representation in local, state, and national
bodies. As a result, much of the legal scholarship has focused on the
scope of the states' obligations to further increase minority
representation, especially in light of past successes. 27 In 1993, the
Supreme Court sharply limited the states' obligations under the VRA
by holding, in Shaw v. Reno, that the Equal Protection Clause is not
amenable to race-based redistricting. 28 Given that the very means that
states have used to further the Act's mandates have come under
assault, it is no surprise that other provisions of the VRA are ripe for
constitutional challenge.
In particular, section 5 of the Act, which is the focus of this
Article, 29 has borne the brunt of criticism in recent attempts to curb
federal power. Many scholars argue that section 5 is still needed in
order to combat discrimination in voting, despite the fact that its
preclearance provisions allegedly interfere with state autonomy over
elections. 30 However, the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,
25. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (a), (b).
27. See sources cited infra note 30.
28. 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913-14 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny to a redistricting plan in which race was a predominant factor in the
creation of districts).
29. Going forward, references to "the Voting Rights Act" and "the VRA" refer specifically to
section 5 unless otherwise noted.
30. See, e.g., Kristen Clark, The CongressionalRecord Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights
Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385,
386 (2008) (arguing that section 5 "helps eliminate barriers to political participation and
provides greater levels of access to minority voters"); Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 714-15 (2006)
(discussing different theories in support of section 5, including the fact that the threat of a
lawsuit under the VRA is an important "bargaining chip"); Nathaniel Persily, The Promises and
Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 199-202 (2007) (discussing section 5's
deterrent effect and violations in covered jurisdictions); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting
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which required that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment be a congruent and
proportional remedy to the alleged constitutional violation, 31 has
raised serious questions about the future of section 5 of the VRA.32
Boerne and other cases that circumscribe Congress's power under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Commerce Clause, and
the constitutional structure have generated a great deal of scholarship
that focuses on whether Congress's 2007 renewal of the VRA for
another twenty five years is constitutional under Boerne's congruence
33
and proportionality standard.
Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 231 (2003) ("The drastic
nature of the Section 5 remedy comes from its abrogation of the autonomy of some state and local
governments in all matters related to voting.").
31. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region,
and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1397 (2010) ("However, the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores
established that Congress's power to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment only
extends to laws that were 'congruent and proportional[]' to the constitutional violations that the
laws attempt to prevent or remedy. Under this new standard, the question arises whether
Congress must justify the coverage formula by distinguishing between covered and noncovered
states in their relative rates of violation of minority voting rights."); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of
the phrase, economic activity."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that federalism
requires Congress to respect state sovereignty) (internal citations omitted); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act "is a criminal
statute that had nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" and cannot be
sustained under the Commerce Clause"). Compare Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared:
CongressionalPower to Amend and Extend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(2007) (presenting cases in which the Court "upheld congressional abrogation of state's sovereign
immunity"), and Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21, at 719 (discussing the Court's and Congress's
acknowledgment of the federalism concerns of the Act), with Richard L. Hasen, Congressional
Power to Renew the PreclearanceProvisionsof the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177-78 (2005) (discussing cases that "increase the chances that the Court
would hold that Congress has the power to reenact Section Five's preclearance provisions").
33. Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why CongressionalReauthorizationof Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and ProportionalResponse to Our Nation's
History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 103-04 (2006)
(analyzing the DOJ's approach to section 5 after Bossier I and Bossier 11); see also Nw. Austin
Mun. Dist. No. Onev. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 272-78 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (upholding section 5
under the congruence and proportionality standard); Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution
Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 47-48 (2006) (discussing the constitutionality of section 2 of the
VRA after City of Boerne); Michael J. Pitts, CongressionalEnforcement of Affirmative Democracy
Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (2005) (discussing
section 2's constitutionality and conflicts with federalism and the congruent and proportional
standard); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691-93 (2006) (analyzing conflicting cases that have addressed
section 2 and suggesting a burden-shifting test to govern section 2 vote denial claims). But see
Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate"Means-Ends Constraintson Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV.

2012]

REINVENTING SOVEREIGNTY?

1205

In sum, the scholarship is replete with discussion of how the
VRA interferes with state sovereignty, and the primary focus has been
on whether this intrusion is justified.34 The Court, at least initially,
believed that Congress had the authority to circumscribe the states'
authority over elections, but not because Congress is sovereign. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for example, the Court rejected the
argument that the VRA distorted our constitutional structure of
government and offended our system of federalism. 35 The Katzenbach
Court found that although the states "have broad powers to determine
the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised," the
Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. 36
The idea that Congress can intervene in elections only when states are
behaving badly has persisted in the case law. The Court's most recent
decision on the constitutionality of section 5, NAMUDNO v. Holder, is
on point. Although sustaining the constitutionality of the Act, the
NAMUDNO Court noted that the VRA raises significant federalism
concerns because it "authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas
of state and local policymaking" and, as such, "imposes substantial
federalism costs" by making distinctions between similarly situated
sovereigns. 37 Thus, because section 5 already has been successful in
1127, 1132 (2001) ("In my view, Section 5 provides Congress with the same capacious discretion
to select among various means to achieving legitimate ends as does Article I as construed in
McCulloch v. Maryland.").
34. See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 32, at 1388 ("We believe that the VRA, and
especially the coverage formula for section 5, needs to be updated or revised specifically to
provide greater protection for minority voting rights. However, we also believe the VRA
continues to represent a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments."); see also Michael Halberstam, The Myth of "Conquered Provinces":
Probing the Extent of the VRA's Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
923, 954-55, 1001 (2011) (debunking the argument that section 5 imposes significant federalism
costs because "preclearance has functioned for the most part as a learning/monitoring regime
that, in over 99% of all cases, has simply required the production of information. In those rare
cases in which an objection has been lodged, the DOJ's concerns usually could be satisfied by
limited changes to the jurisdiction's chosen election design.").
35. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1966) ("Case-by-case litigation
against voting discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, has not
appreciably increased Negro registration. Voting suits have been onerous to prepare, protracted,
and where successful have often been followed by a shift in discriminatory devices, defiance or
evasion of court orders."); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980),
superseded by statute, as recognized in Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO v.
Holder), 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) ("[L]egislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be upheld so long as the Court could find that the enactment 'is plainly
adapted to [the] end' of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and 'is not prohibited by but is
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,' regardless of whether the practices
outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection Clause.").
36. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
37. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282
(1999)).
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reducing discrimination, thereby making covered states no more
culpable for existing discrimination than their northern counterparts,
38
congressional intervention is not justified.
Along these lines, much of the commentary surrounding
NAMUDNO has debated why the Supreme Court continues to sustain
the statute despite doubts about its constitutionality. 39 Recently,
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer has referred to the NAMUDNO Court's
willingness to uphold the statute while employing a narrow and
questionable reading of the language as a "paradox."40 Indeed, the
legitimacy of the NAMUDNO decision often centers on whether the
Court was correct in questioning section 5's constitutionality,
particularly since we live in a "post-racial" society. 4 1 The continued
existence of racially polarized voting in both covered and noncovered
jurisdictions, however, has convinced some scholars that the Court's
concerns about state sovereignty should hold little weight against
sustaining the constitutionality of a statute that is clearly still
42
needed.
What the Court and the legal scholarship ignore, however, is
that concerns about "sovereignty" and "federalism," at least as they
pertain to whether the VRA interferes with the states' authority over
elections, are misplaced for reasons other than the continued need for
section 5.
The Elections Clause, which gives the states the ability to
"choose the time, place, and manner of elections," grants authority

38.

Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?,

104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1712 (2004).

39. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21. Compare City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 181 (upholding the
constitutionality of the VRA), with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980),
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973 (2006)) ("[T]he language of § 2 no more than
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, 9 and the sparse legislative history of § 2
makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself."). City ofRome and City of Mobile were decided the same day.
40. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21, at 702.
41. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Obama Factor: The Impact of the 2008 Presidential
Election on Future Voting Rights Act Litigation, 3 HARv. L. & POLy REV. 59, 59 (2009) ("Some
have suggested that his victory marks the beginning of a 'post-racial' era in which race bears less
significance or consequences."); Abigail Thernstrom & Stephen Thernstrom, Op-Ed, Racial
Gerrymandering is Unnecessary, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at A15 (observing that "American
voters have turned a racial corner"); see also Ansolabehere et al., supra note 32, at 1399 (noting
that "a lack of polarized voting does not speak to whether racial minorities face increased
obstacles or unconstitutional conditions at the polls").
42. Issacharoff, supra note 38, at 1172; Karlan, supra note 32, at 31; see also Adam B. Cox
& Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that
"it is a mistake to judge the efficacy and neutrality of section 5 against an idealized system"
given the level of partisanship in the judiciary).
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that the states exercise freely, so long as Congress decides not to
exercise its power to "alter" state electoral mechanisms. In essence,
Congress has a veto power over state practices that govern federal
elections, a veto that deprives states of the hallmark of sovereignty:
final policymaking authority. As the next Section shows, this absence
of sovereignty makes it difficult for many of the different theories of
federalism to provide an adequate analytical framework for our
electoral system.
B. The Voting Rights Act as an Unjustified Intrusion on State
Sovereignty: The Inadequaciesof Federalism Theory
As the prior Section shows, the legal scholarship, in arguing for
the constitutionality of the VRA, has ignored that the states are not
sovereign over elections and has assumed that the Act is a justified
intrusion on state sovereignty rather than questioning if it is an
intrusion at all. In reality, our system of federalism distinguishes
between state autonomy and state sovereignty: whether the states are
sovereign is determined by the constitutional text, history, and the
specific policy area. With regard to the area of elections, the Elections
Clause gives states autonomy over their electoral apparatuses. This
authority is plenary if Congress has not acted, but it is not sovereign
because Congress retains its authority to modify or alter state
practices. Because of this structure, the Elections Clause is not really
a federalism provision at all. It does not give the states "exclusive
jurisdiction over some set of issues."4 3 The Clause is a decentralized
organizational structure that gives Congress final policymaking
authority over federal elections. And, as Part II.B will show, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments expand this authority to state
elections as well.
This clarification regarding the scope of congressional
authority should inform the level of deference that the Court uses to
analyze congressional acts that alter or change state electoral
practices. If we start from the baseline that the Clause is about
congressional sovereignty, then it quickly becomes apparent that the
VRA is not an intrusion on state sovereignty at all. The problem is
that there has not been a theory of federalism advanced by the Court
or the scholarly literature that can explain the Elections Clause,
which promotes federalism but is not really "federalist" in nature
because there is only one sovereign. Given that most federalism
doctrine either has moved away from sovereignty as the core of
43.

FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 16.
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federalism theory or embraces a dualism that does not reflect the
world we live in, this Article articulates a working theory of
sovereignty to help fill this gap with respect to our system of elections.
First, it is important to understand why the other theories are lacking.
1. Dual Federalism as a Theoretical Framework for the Elections
Clause
Understanding the concept of sovereignty is critical to
articulating a meaningful definition of federalism, particularly with
respect to elections. Sovereignty and autonomy have been embraced as
the focal points of federalism for some scholars, even though the Court
has been laissez-faire in its usage of the terms. Professors Feeney and
Rubin, for example, define federalism as a polity that grants "partial
autonomy" to geographically defined subunits. 44 For these scholars,
partial autonomy is the equivalent of sovereign authority; they focus
on how geography creates a mutually exclusive zone of policymaking
that promotes federalism in a way that a functional grant of powers
over a range of governance areas does not. 45 Having an assigned zone
does not insulate decisionmaking and power in the same way as
defined borders. Moreover, the focus on separate zones of
policymaking reflects that dual federalism, or the idea that the state
and federal governments each have independent spheres of
policymaking authority, remains an organizing principle for many
46
theorists even if it is no longer an accurate description of our system.

44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. ("[Alt least one key to our conception of federalism lies in the question of geography
itself and the significance of geographical divisions of authority, in contrast to other sorts of
divisions."); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 19, at 349 ("[T]o say that a state is sovereign is an
abbreviated way of saying that its sovereignty is limited to some domain. . . . defined
geographically by the territory of the country ...").
46. See Hills, supra note 15, at 815 (discussing the argument that dual federalism is dead
and has been replaced with theories of cooperative federalism); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005) ("[Tjhe conceptual framework
of dual federalism remains pervasive in theory and doctrine."); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 761 (1982) (rejecting the argument that "the States and the Federal Government in all
circumstances must be viewed as co-equal sovereigns" because it is "not representative of the law
today"); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 546 (1975) (forcing state decisionmakers to comply
with the requirements of federal law); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 20-25, 29 (criticizing
the Court for confusing values of federalism with values that emerge from any decentralized
system); Schapiro, supra, at 274 ("Dualist theories of federalism identify important values, but
they do not address the resolution of the conflicts that commonly arise. The theories focus on the
reasons for separating state and federal authority, not on how to reconcile them."). Compare
John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27-28
(1998) (advocating for dual federalism), with Lessig, supra note 16, at 214 (discussing the limits
of federalism).
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Rather, our system is much more fluid because historical, political,
and economic realities have made it largely impossible to keep the two
spheres-state and federal-separate.
As Lawrence Lessig has persuasively argued, all of the early
rules that maintained the line between state and federal power
depended on the Court's ability to draw lines: to distinguish direct
from indirect regulation of commerce, manufacturing from commerce,
and intended from unintended effects. 47 In dormant commerce clause
cases, these distinctions, as well as the ability to measure economic
effects, determined whether a state statute would stand. Similarly, in
the area of federal preemption, the relevant determination turned on
whether federal regulation occupied a particular field and left little or
no room for state regulation.4 8 But the line drawing and formalism
that allowed the Court to maintain these distinctions ultimately made
the Court appear political-first, by the New Deal, 49 then following
the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decision in New York V.
United States,50 and finally by the Court's response to federal
51
regulation of the states in National League of Cities v. Usury.
Because of the risk that any rule drawing a line between state and
federal power may become politicized, Professor Lessig focuses on how
prophylactic rules can indirectly advance federalism. His solution to
the broader problem of the politicization of federalism rules reflects
the hazards of attempting to draw the boundary between state and
federal power to the Court's institutional legitimacy.
Despite the problems that arise in trying to keep state and
federal power separate, the Court continues to adhere to dualfederalism theories because they represent a schematically easier way
of drawing a boundary between state and federal power. Not only is it
simpler for the Court to draw categorical lines, but these distinctions

47. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 139-40 (describing the fact-specific inquiry that the Court
had to use to determine what objects the commerce clause power reached).
48. Id. at 166-67.
49. Id. at 177 ("Why the old categories were rendered political is ... because part of what
these old limits rested upon had itself been drawn into doubt-had been rendered contestable.
Not only the ideas of a passive government in the face of crisis, and the ideas of laissez-faire, but
also some of the very premises of federalism itself ... . To draw these artificial lines to limit
governmental power became artificial; the effort, political.").
50. Id. at 181-82 (discussing how the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland extended to state
immunity from federal taxation, but how the doctrine later fell apart because the inability of the
Court to discern when immunity was appropriate made it look political when it made such
attempts).
51. Id. at 184 ("[T]here could be no firm line that would divide proper from improper federal
regulation; the line instead was constantly shifting. And if the line was constantly shifting, then
the Court couldn't help but appear political in its shifting resolution of these federalism cases.").
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also allow the states to retain some meaningful control over certain
policy areas. 52 But problems remain. Dual federalism tells us very
little about the residual sovereignty that the Court often touts as key
to maintaining the values that the framers had hoped federalism
would promote, nor does this theory shed much light on the autonomy
that the states have in some policymaking areas. 53 Indeed, identifying
sovereign authority, rather than relying on rigid boundaries, helps us
determine where the locus of power truly lies.
The Court, aware of its spotty history in enforcing federalism,
continues to rely on dual federalism in policing Congress's commerce
power, albeit in a diluted form. In United States v. Morrison, the Court
invalidated the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women
Act on the grounds that Congress was impermissibly regulating
noneconomic behavior and therefore exceeded the scope of its
commerce authority and its authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. 54 Morrison, like United States v. Lopez, reflected the
Court's belief that it could enforce a rigid separation between state
and federal power by focusing on the economic/noneconomic
distinction, similar to its early dual-federalism cases. 5 5 But this
proposition quickly fell apart in Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court
held that Congress may regulate local, noneconomic behavior if such
regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated." 56 The shifting boundaries of
federalism made it difficult for the Court to rely on hard lines, despite
its dogged insistence that such lines can and should be drawn. Thus, it
was inevitable that the states' "residual sovereignty" would be defined
by focusing on the outer limits of congressional power.

52. Schapiro, supra note 46, at 271.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that the union is federal in character because "the jurisdiction [of the proposed
Government] extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects" but observing that there will be
controversies related to "the boundary between the two jurisdictions").
54. United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 617-19, 627 (2000).
55. Id. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature."); see Lessig, supra note 16, at 129 ("Lopez is an act of interpretive fidelity. It
is an effort to reconstruct something from the framing balance to be preserved in the current
interpretive context.").
56. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
561 (1995)).
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The Court's ephemeral notion of "residual sovereignty" and
persistence in keeping the boundaries separate have led it to ignore
the definitional problem that arises whenever it tries to use the term
"sovereignty" to describe state action in an area, like elections, where
there are not the separate policy spheres typical of dual federalism. 57
States choose the time, place, and manner of both federal and state
elections, but, in this context, the term "residual sovereignty" has no
special independent significance outside of signifying that the states
retain some power to act. "Residual sovereignty" does not, in and of
itself, serve as an independent source of authority for state action in
58
the Elections Clause because of the congressional veto.
Consequently, dual sovereignty, which serves as the basis for
much of the Court's federalism jurisprudence, does not work as a
theoretical framework for the Elections Clause because it does not
allocate power in a way that is mutually exclusive. 59 It does not give
the states their own independent zone to act, insulated from federal
regulation.
57. See generally Lessig, supra note 16; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the union is federal in character because the
"jurisdiction [of the proposed Government] extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects").
58. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804 (1995) ("[T]he [constitutional]
provisions governing elections reveal the Framers' understanding that powers over the election
of federal officers had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States."); see also Cook v.
Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2001) (rejecting the argument that the states had the right to give
instruction to their representatives that the Tenth Amendment reserved, despite historical
evidence indicating that this practice was common). Indeed, the Cook Court reasoned that the
Tenth Amendment could not reserve any state authority to regulate federal elections since the
federal offices "arise from the Constitution itself." Id. at 522-23 ("Because any state authority to
regulate election to [the federal] offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution,
such power 'had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.' ") (citation omitted).
James Madison had a difficult time discerning the contours of the states' residual sovereignty,
but ultimately concluded that because the state governments are "constituent and essential
parts of the federal government," federal power will, by definition, be constrained. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Thus each of the
principal branches owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and
must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too
obsequious, than too overbearing towards them."); see also id. at 292-93 (noting that the powers
reserved to the states are "numerous and indefinite" but "extend to all the objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement and prosperity of the State").
59. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 648 (explaining that one purpose of the Convention was
to secure sovereignty for the states); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (describing federalism as the
diffusion of sovereign power); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936) (explaining that
while states are only quasi-sovereign, in all power reserved to them they are supreme); Ableman
v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 (1858) ("And the powers of the General Government, and of the State,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and
distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres.").
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Despite this unique power allocation, the Court still interprets
election law regulations from a dualist perspective. The idea that the
VRA intrudes on state sovereignty, as several Justices have argued
over the years, presupposes that the exercise of congressional
authority is so rare as to constitute an exception to the general rule
that this is a policy area that belongs to the states. 60 In other words,
Congress can intrude on state sovereignty over elections, but only if
justified. This proposition is not totally farfetched-the Elections
Clause speaks only to governing the "Elections for Senators and
Representatives," so state sovereignty could conceivably be at issue
since states are required under the Act to preclear any change to their
election laws.
But this is not completely correct given that the Court does not
distinguish between state and federal elections in making arguments
about protecting state sovereignty. 61 And, as I argue in Part II.B, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments limit the amount of residual
sovereignty reserved to the states over practices that govern state
elections. Interestingly, in criticizing the Act on federalism grounds,
the NAMUDNO Court focused on how it differentiates between states;
the Court also said nothing about whether Congress's authority is
broader with respect to regulating federal elections than it is for state
62
elections.
In NAMUDNO, the Court relied on "the structure of the Voting
Rights Act" and "the underlying constitutional concerns [that] compel
a broader reading of the statute" in allowing a small utility district
that did not conduct registration for voting to bail out under section
60. I also use dual federalism as a general label that captures the Court's dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence because that doctrine says that the states cannot legislate in
Congress's domain, even if Congress has not acted, so the presumption that each level of
government has its own exclusive sphere is still in force. See, e.g., Bethlehem Motors Corp. v.
Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 426-27 (1921) (invalidating a state licensing requirement that
disproportionately burdened cars manufactured outside the state); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S.
446, 461 (1886) (holding that state tax on liquor salespeople that discriminated against the
introduction of products from another state was unconstitutional); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S.
344, 350-51 (1880) (invalidating a state licensing statute for agents of articles manufactured in
other states).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 287 (1891) (dismissing indictment of
defendants for violating federal law for failing to open ballot boxes since state elections law did
not clearly require that ballot boxes be opened at the polling place).
62. Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) ("The Act also
differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy 'equal
sovereignty.' Distinctions can be justified in some cases. 'The doctrine of the equality of States..
• does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.' But a departure
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.") (citations
omitted).
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4(a) of the statute. 63 Typically, only states and their political
subdivisions can bail out, or be released from coverage under the Act,
if they illustrate that they conduct registration for voting and have not
discriminated in the past ten years. 64 The Court expanded the scope of
the bailout provisions in order to allow NAMUDNO, which did not
conduct voter registration, to bail out so as to avoid ruling on the
constitutional questions surrounding the preclearance provisions of
section 5. Yet, had the Court acknowledged that Congress has
expansive power over elections, it would have recognized that the
constitutional problems did not emerge from an application of section
5 to the utility district, but rather from the limited scope of section
4(a) in allowing the district to bail out.65 Once the question is framed
properly, it is clear that the small utility district in NAMUDNO
should have been able to bail out from section 5 coverage because it
had not committed any voting rights violations; the ability to bail out
should turn on this factor rather than on whether the jurisdiction
66
conducts registration for voting.
Focusing on the question of whether the section 5 preclearance
regime unjustifiably intrudes on the states' zone of authority over
elections, as the Court did, ignores that there are very few state
electoral procedures that do not have implications for federal elections
and federal representation. 67 As such, dualism has no place in the
63. Id. at 2513.
64. Id. at 2509 (noting that to bail out, a political subdivision "must show that for the
previous 10 years it has not used any forbidden voting test, has not been subject to any valid
objection under § 5, and has not been found liable for other voting rights violations"). The Act
defines "political subdivision" as "any county or parish ... [or] any other subdivision of a State
which conducts registration for voting." Id. at 2514.
65. Abigail Thernstrom, NAMUDNO: Right Question, Wrong Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 8,
2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/namudno-right-question-wrong-case/.
66. See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2514-16 (holding that all political subdivisions, even
those that are not counties or parishes and do not conduct voter registration, are eligible to file
for a bailout).
67. Id. at 2512-13 (implying that section 5 is neither congruent or proportional nor
rationally related and therefore exceeds Congress's power under the Fifteenth Amendment, but
not definitively resolving this question). But see Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404, 408-09 (11th Cir.
1995) (explaining that directing a federal district court to dismiss state election cases would
leave plaintiffs without an adequate forum for vindication of federal constitutional claims); see
also Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425 (2008) (finding that state court orders that changed the
method of election for county commissioners did not have to be precleared "because the
prerogative of the Alabama Supreme Court to say what Alabama law is merits respect in federal
forums, a law challenged at first opportunity and invalidated by Alabama's highest court is
properly regarded as null and void ab initio, incapable of effecting any change in Alabama law or
establishing a voting practice for § 5 purposes"); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997) ("When
the federal statutes speak of 'the election' of a Senator or Representative, they plainly refer to
the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder.");
Ex ParteYarbrough (The Ku Klux Klan Cases), 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (arguing that Congress
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analysis. Based on the Court's approach and reliance on this theory,
however, all it takes is the wrong plaintiff, like an obscure utility
district, to show the limitations of a widely successful piece of civil6
rights legislation. s
As NAMUDNO illustrates, starting from the premise that
states are "sovereign" over elections can potentially result in the
invalidation of legislation that is actually well within congressional
authority to implement. The Elections Clause is not about rigid
boundaries or multiple sovereigns; it is about the broad authority that
the states have to control elections, referenced here as "autonomy,"
and the sovereignty that ultimately lies with Congress, which allows
Congress to intervene through its veto power. It is impossible for dual
federalism to capture this dynamic because the Elections Clause
leaves little room for the exercise in line drawing that this theory
requires.
2. Polyphonic, Cooperative, and Process Federalism as Theoretical
Frameworks for the Elections Clause
In order to escape the rigidity of dual federalism, some scholars
to develop federalism theories that do not focus on strict
sought
have
boundaries between state and federal authority but still provide a
solution to the tension that arises when the two sovereigns try to
coexist. These more fluid theories could describe the context of
elections, where states still play a significant, sometimes even
dominant, role. In particular, Robert Schapiro has argued for what he
calls "polyphonic federalism," or a concurrent federalism that does not
define the state and federal governments as separate governing
enclaves; rather, his theory "asks how the overlapping power of the
69
state and federal governments can best address a particular issue."
Under this functionalist approach, there is a background presumption
70
that state and federal power can coexist.
The problem with Schapiro's approach, which he acknowledges,
is that encouraging the dialogue that polyphonic federalism envisions
between state and federal governments results in an absence of
can regulate state electoral practices that govern federal elections even if state elections are held
on the same day and in the same place, and it is not relevant that "the Congress of the United
States, through long habit and long years of forbearance, has, in deference and respect to the
states, refrained from the exercise of these powers"); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21, at 719.
68. Thernstrom, supra note 65; see also Ansolabehere et al., supra note 32, at 1400 (finding
that, if race-based voting patterns were the only factor to decide if a jurisdiction is covered or
uncovered, the list of covered states would be different than it currently is).
69. Schapiro, supra note 46, at 285.
70. Id. at 295.
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finality and an increase in forum shopping that could undermine the
legitimacy of our electoral system. 71 The need for finality, an
important aspect of sovereign authority and a legitimating factor for
our system of elections, 72 justifies judicial deference toward
congressional action that alters or modifies state electoral provisions.
Polyphonic federalism, much like dual federalism, sheds little light on
how the judiciary should approach a text that imagines a role for two
sovereigns but creates a context in which there can only be one.
While polyphonic federalism does not focus on sovereignty and
instead uses shared authority as its underlying theory, many
commentators have rejected a sovereignty-based account of federalism
in its entirety. 73 This rejection is most prominent in theories of
cooperative federalism which, according to one scholar, "invite[] state
agencies to implement federal law," primarily through federal
regulatory programs. 74 The benefits of such cooperation are that it
results in a diversity of regulatory policy within a framework of
uniform federal standards. It has the coordination between sovereigns
that tends to be absent in dual-federalism regimes. 75 The coordination
and freedom that state agencies have to tweak federal programs do
71. This is already a significant concern. Id. at 291; see also Kennedy, 553 U.S. at 406-07
(lawsuit filed in state and federal courts); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (treating
application for stay of state Supreme Court's mandate as petition for writ of certiorari and
granting it); Roe, 68 F.3d at 405-06 (federal lawsuit where question was certified to state court).
72. See sources cited supranote 21.
73. These commentators observe that concurrent federalism, where the states and the
federal government share authority, is more reflective of our system. See John Kincaid, The
Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal Democracy, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 87 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Philip J. Weiser, Federal
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1692, 1692 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Federal Common Law]; Philip J. Weiser, Towards a
ConstitutionalArchitecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (arguing
that, despite talk about dual federalism, in reality Congress enacts cooperative regulatory
programs); Joseph F. Zimmerman, National.State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the
Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 18 (2001) (describing cooperative federalism as the opposite
of dual federalism). Others focus on institutional arrangements outside of state and federal
regimes that can give minorities power without sovereignty. See Gerken, supra note 21
(recasting federalism as minority rule without sovereignty, which focuses attention on ignored
institutions).
74. Weiser, Federal Common Law, supranote 73, at 1694.
75. Id. at 1697 ("A critical feature of cooperative federalism statutes is the balance they
strike between complete federal preemption (a preemptive federalism) and uncoordinated federal
and state action in distinct regulatory spheres (a dual federalism). Under preemptive federalism
regimes like the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), for instance, the federal
courts interpret federal enactments or defer to federal agency action as preempting all state
action in a field. Dual federalism regimes, by contrast, separate federal and state authority into
two uncoordinated domains, giving rise to heated legal battles and considerable confusion for the
regulated parties.").
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not require sovereignty to be a focal point. While final policymaking
authority may lie with Congress under cooperative federalism, this
authority is somewhat illusory. States, in implementing federal
programs, require flexibility and freedom, tend to be more
knowledgeable about the underlying policy, and modify federal rules
to comport with local circumstances-a system that strongly implies
76
that neither body is truly sovereign.
There are several persuasive arguments that support
cooperative federalism as an underlying theoretical framework for our
system of elections. The first is the text-it provides that states will
draw the lines in the first instance but gives Congress the ability to
change or alter such plans, suggesting a coordination that is akin to
many modern federal regulatory programs. The second is our political
system. Thanks to the two-party model, state and federal officials
coordinate in order to draw district lines and pass electoral rules that
give each party the best chance of maximizing its electoral success.
The two-party system unites state and federal officials, who
77
coordinate their efforts in order to advance partisan goals.
The problem with cooperative federalism as a framework,
however, emerges from the same textual provision that initially led us
to believe it might work: the congressional veto. The congressional
veto allows Congress to engage in what is effectively a full preemption
of state law over federal elections. Cooperative federalism is designed
to prevent the full preemption of state law by giving the federal
agency and the state the responsibility of implementing federal law. 78
The second problem is that most cooperative federalism programs
entail voluntary state involvement. The VRA and other federal
legislation that alters or changes state electoral practices are anything
but voluntary and tend to trigger substantial outrage on the part of
the states. 79 Finally, the allocation of power in our electoral system
76. Id. at 1700 ("As a result of this need for cooperation, both the states and the federal
government are well aware that they are tied together in their ability to administer cooperative
federalism programs. The resulting interdependence gives each important influence over the
other."); see also id. at n.13 ("Cooperative federalism statutes regularly include 'savings clauses,'
which explicitly allow states to impose more stringent requirements than federal law demands.").
77. See Kramer, supra note 13 at 276 ("[D]ecentralized national political parties ... linked
the fortunes of federal officeholders to state politicians and parties and in this way assured
respect for state sovereignty."); Tolson, supra note 21, at 862 (arguing that redistricting can
protect state authority from expanding federal power).
78. Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 73, at 1697-98.
79. For example, when Congress first passed the VRA, South Carolina immediately
challenged its constitutionality. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966)
(upholding challenged portions of the VRA). States and their political subdivisions have
continued to challenge the constitutionality of the Act over the years. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (applying constitutional avoidance canon to
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cannot be understood without referencing sovereignty, although there
can be some disagreement as to where the locus of sovereignty should
lie.8 0 As a result, trying to apply a cooperative framework, which is not
focused on the core of power but its allocation from somewhere other
than the core, to the Elections Clause brings us back to our initial
questions about which level of government has the authority to do
what.
Sovereignty similarly has not been central to -advocates of
process federalism, who believe that the values of federalism are best
served by focusing on procedural constraints on federal power that can
be enforced in the courts. 8 ' With regard to the substance of federalism
doctrine, these theorists observe that the state and federal
governments will generate policy in order to compete for the political
allegiance of citizens.8 2 As a result, some (but not all) of these scholars
to
believe that the political process, rather than the courts, is best able 84
8 3 Others embrace a limited form of judicial review.
police federalism.
The problem with process theory, and in particular the political
safeguards approach, is that, standing alone, it tells us very little
about what our federalism should look like.8 5 The political safeguards
refrain from deciding if preclearance requirements are unconstitutional); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980) (upholding Katzenbach).
80. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 21, at 8 (proposing to recast federalism as including
minority rule through small administrative units lacking sovereignty).
81. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism,46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1364 (2001)
("Process federalism's central insight is that the federal/state balance is affected not simply by
what federal law is made, but by how that law is made. Most classic separation of powers
issues--delegation, for example, or the legitimacy of federal common lawmaking-thus have an
important federalism dimension. The converse also seems true: We can go a long way towards
assuring state autonomy by policing the federal lawmaking process, even if we are unwilling or
unable to enforce substantive limits on federal power.").
82. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 6 (listing one of the well-known benefits of federalism as
competition); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 59-61
(2004) (arguing that states provide political competition for popular loyalty).
83. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison) (discussing political and institutional
checks on national power). But see THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (James Madison) (discussing scope of
judicial authority and courts as a way to effectuate constitutional provisions); Young, supra note
81, at 1354 (arguing that judicial review in federalism cases should be an important secondary
mechanism for maintaining political safeguards).
84. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) ("[W]e are
convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the
Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result. Any
substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in
the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a sacred province of state
autonomy."); Young, supra note 81, at 1372-73 (arguing that federalism doctrines "should
maximize the ability of the system to police itself').

85. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-52, 558-
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are less about presenting a theory of federalism and more about
choosing a forum to resolve these issues.8 6 Whether or not one believes
that courts are best suited to address these questions,8 7 it is
undisputed that the courts are haunted by line drawing and
definitional problems that have plagued every theory of federalism
that they have formulated up to this point. None of the theories or
approaches discussed above definitively resolves how the Court should
approach the Elections Clause which, I argue, has a decentralized
organizational structure that appears to mimic federalism but in
reality concentrates final policymaking authority in only one
sovereign-Congress.8 8 As the next Part shows, the constitutional
history and text, as well as the Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
support this view of the Elections Clause.

59 (1954) (arguing that "the existence of the states as governmental entities and as sources of the
standing law is in itself the prime determinant of our working federalism"); see also Kramer,
supra note 13, at 220 (discussing Wechsler's arguments in depth); Young, supra note 81, at 1373
(embracing process theory but noting that it deserves "two cheers" instead of three because "even
a process oriented Court ought to impose some substantive limits on federal regulatory
authority").
86. Schapiro, supra note 46, at 279-80 ("[T]he most significant problem with the political
safeguards approach is that it is fundamentally a theory of judicial review, not a theory of
federalism. The political safeguards argument explains why courts should not draw lines
between the state and federal government .... However, the theory does not tell Congress how it
should make the allocational decisions."); cf. Prakash & Yoo, supra note 14, at 1461-62 (laying
out criticisms of political safeguards theory); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of
Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1318-21 (1997) (discussing scope and criticisms of political.
safeguards theory). See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) ("To be sure,
one conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist Papers is that the balance between
national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the political process.") (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
87. Compare Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (1994)
("[Here we come, finally, to the crux of the argument against judicially-enforced federalismthat courts are poorly situated to make (or second guess) the difficult judgments about where
power should be settled or when it can be shifted advantageously. Judges lack the resources and
institutional capacity to gather and evaluate the data needed for such decisions. They also lack
the democratic pedigree to legitimize what they do if it turns out to be controversial. But most of
all, courts lack the flexibility to change or modify their course easily, an essential quality in
today's rapidly evolving world. Stare decisis is still a major force guiding judicial decision
making-a quality we should be loath to surrender, but one that most definitely impedes the
ability of courts to abandon previous holdings."), with Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism
Doctrine:Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and CompensatingAdjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1733, 1748-49 (2005) ("The open-textured nature of the Constitution's structural
commitments calls for judicial implementation through doctrine: There is -simply no way to
administer our federal system without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of
authority.").
88. FEELEY AND RUBIN, supra note 10, at ch. 1 (distinguishing federalism from
decentralization).
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE: THE HISTORY, TEXT, AND
CASE LAW

The framers chose a federalist system to protect the people
from tyranny by allocating power between the states and the federal
government

9

to counteract ambition with ambition, so to speak. 90 But

very little of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence concerns the
people as sovereigns; 91 rather, much of its focus has been on how to
protect the sovereignty of the states as states from federal
overreaching. 92 Protecting the people as sovereigns and protecting the
states as states are values of federalism that have converged, with
federal overreaching seen as antithetical to the interests of the state
and, by implication, the interests of the people. 93 This makes defining
sovereignty and developing a normative theory of federalism very
difficult when the interests of the people and the state diverge or when
the interests of the people are more aligned with federal interests.
Federalism is destined to be instrumental and incremental without a
basic framework that outlines the attributes of sovereignty.
The Elections Clause, with its initial allocation of power to the
states, and its subsequent delegation to Congress of the power to alter
state electoral arrangements, escapes the textual and historical
89. See BAILYN, supra note 19, at 201 (noting that the theory of parliamentary sovereignty
triumphed in England at the end of the Glorious Revolution because it is justified by a theory of
the ultimate supremacy of the people, a supremacy that is "normally dormant and exercised only
at moments of rebellion against tyrannical government," a theory "that was carried on into the
eighteenth century and into the debates that preceded the American Revolution").
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.").
91. For a recent exception, see Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364, 2367 (2011)
(finding that individuals can bring Tenth Amendment claims and that federalism provides
liberties to citizens through the diffusion of sovereign power). Yet, even the Bond Court viewed
this individual cause of action as a part of protecting the sovereignty of the states. See id. at 2364
("[T]he allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual
sovereignty of the States. The federal balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States
function as political entities in their own right.").
92. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that "Congress
cannot conscript the State's officers directly" (emphasis added)); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program" (emphasis added)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 473 (1991) (holding that the "people of Missouri" have the "prerogative as citizens of a
sovereign State" to "establish a qualification for those who would be their judges" and "[n]either
the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the choice they have made" (emphasis
added)).
93. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (discussing federalism values from the vantage point of the
state being able to ensure that its citizens have certain things).
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constraints that plague judicial attempts to find substantive
restrictions on congressional authority. There is an organizing
principle for the Elections Clause just by virtue of the way it allocates
power between "sovereigns"--here, the federal government and the
states-which highlights why the distinction between "sovereignty"
and "autonomy" is important. Yet the Court's difficulty separating
sovereignty from autonomy in its federalism jurisprudence raises
interesting questions about a provision of the Constitution that
specifically denies that states are sovereign.
As Part II.A shows, the founding generation, and in particular
the Anti-Federalists, recognized that the Elections Clause deprived
the states of their sovereign authority over elections. This history
explains why the Clause generated so much opposition during the
debates over the ratification of the Constitution. Part II.B illustrates
that the Court has recognized the absence of state sovereignty in its
interpretation of the Elections Clause, although it has not extended
this understanding of limited state power to the context of voting
rights. Part II.C argues that Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, when combined with its
power under the Elections Clause, illustrates that our electoral system
is about congressional, not state, sovereignty.
A. The Elections Clause as a Source of State Autonomy and
CongressionalSovereignty
1. The Elections Clause as a Constraint on State Authority: The
Historical Record
The states' lack of sovereignty over elections is consistent with
our system of federalism and our constitutional history. The
constitutional framework embraced multiple layers of authority to
prevent both levels of government from being sovereign in the same
regulatory sphere at the same time. This system of divided governance
was inherited from Great Britain and was common in the colonies
until the 1760s. 94 The pre-Revolutionary period was first defined by
divided sovereignty between the Crown and Parliament, and then the
theory of parliamentary sovereignty became dominant, defined as

94. See ALLISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 5 (2010)
(citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))
( The Framers split the atom of sovereignty .... [T]heir idea that our citizens would have two
").
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected by incursion from the other ....
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unlimited and undivided sovereignty within a single polity. 95
Throughout this period, the colonies continued to exercise autonomy
over areas of local jurisdiction. 96 The notion of parliamentary
sovereignty and the corresponding lack of divided authority served as
the basis for many of the disputes between Great Britain and the
97
colonists.
The post-Revolutionary period reflected these concerns about
having one supreme authority, which is why the federal government
was extremely weak under the Articles of Confederation. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention recognized that more
power had to be ceded to the federal government without completely
eliminating the sovereign nature of the states. The founders designed
the Constitution so that the states would retain control over local
matters and, to avoid the despotism of parliamentary sovereignty, the
federal government would exercise power only over limited areas that
tended to exceed or fall outside of the scope of local competencies. 98
Sovereignty, at least from the 1760s on, was not "final, unqualified,
and indivisible" in only one body; instead, the power was divided
between two sovereigns, each responsible for specific policy areas,
with ultimate sovereignty lying with the people. 99
The struggle over the delegation of sovereign authority
continued well after the new government was established. In
particular, the debate during the Constitutional Convention about the
proposed congressional veto over all state laws illustrates how the
congressional veto in the Elections Clause was intended to be a
delegation of sovereignty from the states to the federal government.
The Articles of Confederation were ineffective, in part, because of

95. Id. at 13-15 (noting that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "[t]he
idea that separate and equal authorities could exist within the same juridical boundaries
offended contemporary understandings of the very nature of government power" and noting that
some commentators stated that Parliament "hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority...").
96. See BAILYN, supra note 19, at 200, 202-03 (noting that except for certain powers
England exercised over "only the outer fringes of colonial life" that "[aill other powers were
enjoyed . . . by local, colonial organs of government"). In the seventeenth century, there was a
dispute over where the locus of sovereignty lay-with the Crown or Parliament. By the Glorious
Revolution, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, justified by the notion that the people are
supreme, was the dominant theory in England until the eve of the American Revolution. Id. at
200-01.
97. LACROIX, supra note 94, at 17 (noting that the nature of sovereignty was contested and
that there were "two versions of the British Constitution"-the one "in which Parliament was
omnipotent" and "the colonial interpretation, premised on the belief that there were limits to
Parliament's authority to legislate for the colonies") (internal citations omitted).
98. Id. at 35, 132-33.
99. See BAILYN, supra note 189, at 200-28 (discussing the progression from the idea of an
absolute, unified sovereignty to the Revolutionary idea of sovereignty in the people).
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Congress's inability to control the content or direction of state laws
that conflicted with its own dictates. To address this problem, Charles
Pinckney proposed during the Constitutional Convention "that the
National Legislature should have authority to negative all laws which
they should judge to be improper."10 0 Both Pinckney and James
Madison believed that the provision was necessary because "the States
must be kept in due subordination to the nation," 10 1 and each
understood that a powerful central government was key for the nation
to succeed. Along these lines, one delegate, in rejecting the idea that
the congressional negative should be limited, observed the following:
Federal liberty is to States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals. And States are
not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political
sovereignty, [than] the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his
personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in
which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be left on
other? [W]ill it not be most safely lodged on the side of the National
one side or the
102
government?

The national government, therefore, should have this power
because we are "one nation of brethren" and "must bury all local
interests and distinctions.' 1 3 Thus, the congressional negative
represented a passing of sovereignty from. the states to the national
government because the states would have no longer had any
assurances of finality in the passing of their own laws.
James Madison had proposed the congressional negative to
Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and George Washington in the
months prior to the Convention, arguing that the "federal negative"
would establish the supremacy of the national government. 10 4 Madison
envisioned it as a tool to keep the states from defeating acts of
Congress, violating national treaties, and being aggressive toward
each other. The proposal was ultimately defeated, however, because of
fear that the negative gave Congress unchecked authority,

100. James Madison, Debate on the Veto of State Laws, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 58 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003) (June 8,1787).
101. Id. at 58-59. This provision was a part of Article VI of the Virginia Plan, which gave the
national legislature the ability "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in
the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union." James Madison, The Virginia
Plan, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 16 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (May 29,
1787) (noting that James Madison supported "Charles Pinckney's motion for an unlimited veto
over state laws").
102. Madison, supra note 100, at 60.
103. Id.
104. LACROIX, supra note 94, at 138-39.
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particularly over the internal workings of the states. 105 Nevertheless,
the debate over the congressional negative speaks to the larger debate
concerning the locus of authority and power contained in the Elections
Clause.
Madison believed that the congressional negative would show
that power emanated from the center; he was willing, in fact, to model
the negative after the one used by the very empire from which
colonists had sought freedom: Great Britain. The federal negative
mirrored "the same type of ex ante review of state legislative acts that
the British Crown, through the mechanism of the Privy Council, had
formerly wielded over the acts of the colonial assemblies."' 10 6 According
to Allison LaCroix, 'Madison envisioned the federal negative
functioning in the same manner as the Privy Council's practice of
reviewing statutes ex ante, in a general posture, before they could be
10 7
applied in individual cases or challenged by specific parties."'
Thus, Madison's view of the scope and nature of the
congressional negative was that it would have sharply limited state
sovereignty and state autonomy by giving Congress the ability to
invalidate state laws before they went into effect. 108 The proposal of a
congressional negative was ultimately defeated, however, because, for
many delegates, it resembled too closely the practices of Great Britain
during the pre-Revolutionary period. 10 9 Other delegates expressed
fears that a congressional negative over state laws placed too much
power in Congress, but they expressed a willingness to support a
negative in a more narrow form. Thus, the congressional veto in the
Elections Clause represents a compromise of sorts: it gives Congress
the ability to veto state laws in limited, but important,
circumstances--representation
and voting. The importance of
elections was a recurrent theme during the Convention, so Congress's
ability to veto state electoral regulations was widely seen as necessary
to prevent the states from destroying the national government without

105. Madison, supra note 100, at 58-60 (stating that Mr. Williamson was concerned that a
congressional negative would undermine states ability to control internal police and that Mr.
Sherman believed the nature of the congressional veto should be defined).
106. LACROIX, supra note 94, at 139; id. at 141 ("By positing that lands beyond the realm
were held by the monarch alone by virtue of conquest, the doctrine of the king's dominions vested
the king's council with authority to oversee colonial legislation and to review the decisions of
colonial courts.").
107. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 146 (noting that the negative gave "the general government the power to police
both a state's relationship with its inhabitants and its relationship with its fellow states").
109. See id. at 147-54 (stating that some thought the negative looked "like little more than a
rehash of imperial procedure").
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intruding on state sovereignty in the same way that a general
negative over state laws would have.
Even the limited veto over elections, however, was problematic
for some in the founding generation. The Elections Clause furthered
fears that the Constitution created an all-powerful national
government that would introduce tyranny, despotism, and a governing
aristocracy. To address these concerns, Federalists often drew
parallels between the rights that free men surrendered to their
governments to protect liberty and the power that states relinquished
to the central authority, also viewed as necessary to protect
freedom.11 0 In other words, just as individuals had to give up some of
their individual liberty to state governments in order to secure
peaceful enjoyment of those liberties, so too did states have to
surrender some of their power to the federal government for the same
purpose-to protect the people. The congressional veto in the Elections
Clause, from this perspective, was simply another layer of protection
for the people in return for the states surrendering their final
policymaking authority over elections to the federal government."'
Even though the Convention ultimately rejected a general
congressional negative over state laws and despite the delegates'
assurances about the limited nature of the congressional veto in the
Elections Clause, the states recognized the danger that the
congressional veto over elections presented. The loss of sovereignty,
even in this limited context, led Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
for example, to propose an amendment to the Elections Clause that

110. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself."); see also HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 11 (1981) ("[Jiust as individuals have to give up some of their
natural rights to civil government to secure peaceful enjoyment of civil rights, so states must
give up some of theirs to federal government in order to secure peaceful enjoyment of federal
liberties." (citing multiple sources)). The analogy between individual liberty/states and state
liberty/federal government was a common one. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 100, at 60
(comments of James Wilson) ("Federal liberty is to States, what civil liberty, is to private
individuals. And States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of
their political sovereignty, than the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his
personal sovereignty ... ").
111. See generally Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 73 (1997) (noting that one of the reasons that
Congress, pursuant to its power under the Elections Clause, passed a statute fixing the election
of congressional members to the same day is to remedy "the distortion of the voting process
threatened when the results of an early federal election in one State can influence later voting in
other States, and with the burden on citizens forced to turn out on two different election days to
make final selections of federal officers in Presidential election years .... ") (citing CONG. GLOBE,
42d CONG., 2d SESS. 141 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Butler)).

2012]

REINVENTING SOVEREIGNTY?

1225

would allow Congress to exercise its veto power only if states failed to
call for congressional elections or passed electoral laws that otherwise
subverted rights protected by the Constitution. 11 2 James Winthrop,
writing in the Massachusetts Gazette, proposed fourteen conditions for
accepting the new Constitution, including, "Congress shall have no
power to alter the time, place or manner of elections, nor any
authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such state as shall
neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not exceeding
113
the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one year."
Other individuals writing at the time also expressed alarm at the veto,
with one questioning "how can [C]ongress guarantee to each state a
republican form of Government" when the "time place & Manner of
chusing the Members of the Lower house is intirely [at their
14
mercy]."1
The notion that the veto would be used rarely and only for
practical reasons' 1 5 did little to comfort opponents who feared that the
Elections Clause undermined the proposed constitution's creation of a
federation and evinced an intent by the national government to absorb
the states. As one commentator opined:
By sect. 4th of the 1st article, "the times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the

112. See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION
1787-1788, at 448 (2010) ("All of the states that recommended amendments asked for a
modification of that provision so Congress could regulate congressional elections only when
states themselves did not or could not call elections. Massachusetts and New Hampshire also
proposed to add a statement that would allow Congress to use its power over elections against
state electoral rules that were 'subversive of the rights of the People to a free & equal
representation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution.' ").
113. See James Winthrop, "Agrippa"XVIII, MASS. GAZETrE (Bos.), Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS SPEECHES, ARTICLES,
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART Two 155, 158 (1993) [hereinafter

THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART TWO].
114. Letter from Joseph Spencer to James Madison, Enclosing John Leland's Objections
(Feb. 28, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART TWO, supra note 113, at 267, 268
(noting the objections of John Leland, a leading Virginia Baptist).
115. See Letter from Samuel Holdon Parsons to William Cushing, Our Security Must Rest in
Our Frequently Recurring Back to the People (Jan. 11, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING
THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART ONE 748, 751 (1993) [hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE

CONSTITUTION, PART ONE] ("[i]t appears to me proper that Congress should determine the Time,
our Different Legislatures have on this Subject gone into different Practices, it is necessary all
Elections should be in Season to attend the federal Legislature and expedient, at least, they
should be in One Day throughout the Union this can only be done by the national Authority-it
may be so that the present Places of holding Elections will be impossible for the Electors to be
convened at . . . it may happen that some one of the States in the Union may neglect or refuse to
make any Law by which the Electors may be conven'd.").
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place of chusing senators?" The plain construction of which is, that when the state
legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation of this government, then
Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and
senators. 116

Thus, even those who would not go as far as accusing Congress
of attempting to abolish the states expressed discomfort with the
congressional veto because it still represented an opportunity for
Congress to assert undue influence over elections. This prospect, when
taken to its most extreme conclusion, gave Congress the means to
destroy the states' ability to be independent, autonomous units. One
individual writing during the ratification debates argued that
"Congress [is] to have the power of fixing the time, place, and manner
of holding elections, so as to keep [the states] forever subjected to [its]
influence." I 7 The common response by Federalists was that Congress
would prevent the undue influence of partisan zeal that came from
unchecked state control of elections 1 8 The congressional veto in the
Elections Clause was linked to the then-prevailing notion that the
national government would be insulated from the passions of the
people in a way that the states were not and probably should not be.119
The absence of sovereignty in the Clause, therefore, was viewed by the
founding generation as a structural safeguard against partisan zeal
and tyranny. The veto also reflected the delegates' fear that the states,
had they been in complete control of elections, could have used this
power to the detriment of their citizens, who would have little
20
recourse.1

116. Samuel Bryan, Centinel I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE, supra note 115, at 52, 58-59.
117. William Findley?, Reply to Wilson's Speech: "An Officer of the Late Continental Army,"
INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART
ONE, supra note 115, at 100.
118. Rebuttal to "An Officer of the Late ContinentalArmy": "PlainTruth", INDEP. GAZETTEER
(Phila.), Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE, supra note
115, at 111 ("Congress indeed are to have control to prevent undue influence in elections, which
we all know but too often happens through party zeal.").
119. See, e.g., Oliver Ellsworth, Reply to Elbridge Gerry: "A Landholder"IV, CONN. COURANT
(Hartford), Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE, supra note
115, at 234, 236 ("[Plerhaps it may be said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to
the time and places of electing, and we allow they have: But this objection which at first looks
frightful was designed as a guard to the privileges of the electors. Even state assemblies may
have their fits of madness and passion, this tho' not probable is still possible.").
120. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Thursday Aug. 9 in Convention, in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 414, 425 (Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (comments of Madison)
(noting that the Elections Clause "was meant to give the National Legislature a power not only
to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or
refuse altogether").
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Many of the delegates also believed that the Clause was
necessary because of basic differences of opinion between the state
governments and the delegates over what form national elections
should take. For example, members of the House of Representatives
are elected to two-year terms and senators are elected to six-year
terms with no term limits for either, a structure that was different
from many of the state systems at the time. 21 While these differences
and others were points of concern during the state ratification
debates, the disagreements over the Elections Clause occurred in a
framework where most of the delegates, despite advocating for the
congressional veto power, believed that states should still have broad
authority over elections.122 Yet these delegates could not deny their
concern that states were more susceptible to abusing their authority
than Congress would be in using its veto power. Giving states
autonomy but not sovereignty addressed this concern.
Notions of dual and concurrent sovereignty do little to capture
the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the veto-that there
cannot be two sovereigns that make final decisions with regard to
elections. And, more importantly, there cannot be two sovereigns
without ignoring the concerns that the framers had about the
potential for abuse if states had sole authority over their electoral
apparatuses. Indeed, the debates during the Constitutional
Convention recognized the loss of state sovereignty inherent in giving
Congress the ability to negate state laws in their entirety. Thus, the
actual structure of the Clause, much like the rejected congressional
negative, creates a decentralized structure over elections where state
authority is broad but Congress has a veto that, even if used
sparingly, still reflects a one-sovereign regime rather than a dualist or
concurrent one.
Ironically, the Elections Clause has not been a useful
repository of congressional authority because of many of the same
federalism concerns that led to the demise of the proposed

121. MAIER, supra note 112, at 31 ("The Constitution put no limit on the number of terms
representatives and senators could serve, unlike both the Articles of Confederation and many
state constitutions, which imposed terms limits to avoid . . . an 'inconvenient aristocracy' of
entrenched officials with no immediate knowledge of the people's needs and feelings.").
122. Id. at 452 (noting that Aedanus Burke proposed to limit Congress's authority over
elections to " 'only when any state shall refuse or neglect, or be unable, by invasion or rebellion'
to make such regulation itself' as a part of the Bill of Rights); id. at 151 (discussing objections by
individual towns in Massachusetts and Connecticut to Congress's power to overrule the states
over the matter of elections); id. at 339 (discussing similar objections in the New York
ratification debates); see also 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 597 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (giving states the ability to "prescribe the time & manner of holding elections"
under the Pinckney's Plan submitted to John Quincy Adams).
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congressional negative over all state laws. 123 Congress's sparing use of
its veto power over the years has allowed the states' authority under
the Elections Clause to become dominant and have more influence in
our system of federalism. 124 Nevertheless, the existence of a
congressional veto gives Congress substantial leeway when in fact it
does opt to regulate state electoral authority, through either the
Clause or other related constitutional provisions. And, as history
reminds us, the veto represents a delegation of sovereignty on the part
of the states, a fact that should play a large role in how the Supreme
Court interprets congressional action going forward.
2. The Elections Clause as a Repository of Congressional Power: The
Case Law
Unlike most federalism issues, there is constitutional text that
explicitly deprives the states of complete sovereignty over the matter
of elections; the Elections Clause gives states autonomy-or a right to
make policy and exercise regulatory authority for the benefit of its
citizens absent congressional intervention. 25 The Court has not

123. As one writer noted:
A general uniformity of acting in confederations (whenever it can be done with
convenience) must tend to federalize (allow me the word) the sentiments of the people.
The time, then, might as well have been fixed in the Constitution-not subject to
alteration afterwards. Because a day may be chosen by Congress which the Constitution
or laws of a State may have appropriated to local purposes, not to be subverted or
suspended. Leaving the places subject to the alteration of Congress, may also lead to
improper consequences, and (humanum est errare)tempt to sinister views.
Strictures on the Proposed Constitution, FREEMAN'S J., Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE, supra note 115, at 18, 19. This history is discussed at length
in Tolson, supra note 21, at 877-88.
124. Tolson, supra note 21, at 884-87 (discussing Congress's use of its authority under the
Elections Clause, which is controversial because of federalism concerns). Since 1842, Congress
has used its authority under the Elections Clause to require states to create single member
districts that are compact and contiguous. However, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
although more narrow in some respects because of cases interpreting the Amendments to require
proof of discriminatory intent, see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), have done
much of the work that the Clause would have otherwise accomplished. Id.; see also infra Part
II.B. The problem is that premising congressional action solely on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, instead of in conjunction with the Elections Clause, calls into question the
constitutionality of federal legislation like the VRA, the scope of which extends beyond federal
elections and encompasses state practices as well.
125. Young, supra note 82, at 14 (" 'Autonomy,' on the other hand, emphasizes the positive
use of governmental authority, rather than the unaccountability of the government itself. The
OED defines 'autonomy' as '[t]he right of self-government, of making [a state's] own laws and
administering its own affairs.' ") (alteration in original); see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at
29 ("In a decentralized regime, the central authority can always override the decisions of the
subdivisions if they fail to achieve the purpose that the centralized authority intended when it
authorized the subdivisions to decide.").
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explicitly adopted this position, but its case law recognizes that the
states delegated a portion of their sovereignty over elections to the
federal government with the ratification of the Constitution.
In Foster v. Love, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana
open-primary statutory scheme that violated the Elections Clause by
changing the day on which candidates for federal office were elected.
The Supreme Court described the Elections Clause as "a default
provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of
congressional elections,... but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices ... ,"126 The Court interpreted the
Clause as giving Congress" 'comprehensive' authority to regulate the
details of elections, including the power to impose 'the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows
are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.'"127
Similarly, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme
Court held that Arkansas, even though it had reserve power over the
selection of its congressional representatives, violated the
Qualifications Clause when it prevented otherwise eligible individuals
who had been elected three or more times to the House or two or more
times to the Senate from appearing on the ballot.128 The Qualifications
congressional
on
limits
term
impose
not
does
Clause
representatives. 129 The Court found that the state's attempt to impose
term limits as an added requirement to the Qualifications Clause was
130
contrary to the constitutional text, structure, and history.
The Court reasoned that, since Congress has no authority to
change the qualifications of its members,1 3 1 states are similarly
limited as the qualifications for members of Congress in the
Constitution are "fixed and exclusive."'132 In an earlier case, Powell v.
McCormick, the Court applied this same reasoning to circumscribe

126. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (internal citations omitted) (citing multiple
sources).
127. Id. at 71 n.2 (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
128. 514 U.S. 779, 800 (1995).

129. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.").
130. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995) (discussing "a proposal made by the Committee of
Detail that would have given Congress the power to add property qualifications" which was
rejected because James Madison argued that "such a power would vest 'an improper &
dangerous power in the Legislature,' by which the Legislature 'can by degrees subvert the
Constitution.' ") (certain internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 533-34 (1969)).
131. Id. at 791-92 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 539).
132. Id. at 790.
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Congress's ability to exclude a duly elected individual from being able
to take his seat. 133 In contrast, Thornton dealt specifically with the
issue of whether the state had the ability to change the qualifications
134
of its congressional delegation, even if Congress lacked this ability.
The Court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that if
states could alter the qualifications of congressional representatives it
would violate basic principles of representative government. The
Court reached this conclusion in part by observing that "sovereignty is
vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the
right to choose freely their representatives to the National
3
Government."1 5
Although Thornton did not involve the Elections Clause, the
Court recognized that the states delegated at least some of their
authority over elections to the federal government when they ratified
the Constitution. The Court observed that the power to add
qualifications was not within the original powers of the states, and,
even if it were, this power was stripped from the states with the
ratification of the Constitution. As the Court noted, "[T]he States
unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority.
They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not
divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to
136
the Federal Government.
Thus, as Thornton recognizes, in order to have sovereignty over
the incidents of a federal system, such as altering the qualifications of
the congressional delegation, the power must be left to the states by
the Constitution.'1 7 The Elections Clause, even though it gives the
states broad power over the time, place, and manner of elections,
represents a delegation of power from the states to the federal
government because it leaves final authority to Congress. As the
Thornton Court noted,
[I]n Art. I, § 4, cl.1, though giving the States the freedom to regulate the "Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections," the Framers created a safeguard against state abuse
by giving Congress the power to "by Law make or alter such Regulations." The
Convention debates make clear that the Framers' overriding concern was the potential
for States' abuse of the power to set the "Times, Places and Manner" of elections.
Madison noted that "it was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of
the discretionary power." ... As Hamilton later noted: "Nothing can be more evident

133. Id. at 790-93 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 539).
134. Id. at 800.
135. Cf. id. at 794 (discussing its holding in Powell with regards to representative
government).
136. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original omitted) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
137. Id. at 805.
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than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, in the
hands of the
State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their
13 8
mercy."

This notion that the Constitution deprived states of their
sovereign authority over elections is consistent with the constitutional
history and text, and the Court's precedent. 139 To find otherwise would
give the states the ability to subvert Congress's veto power in the
Elections Clause. As the Thornton Court observed with regard to the
states' ability to alter the qualifications of their congressional
delegation, "[I]t is inconceivable that the Framers would provide a
specific constitutional provision to ensure that federal elections would
be held while at the same time allowing States to render those
elections meaningless by simply ensuring that no candidate could be
40
qualified for office."'
Indeed, what is notable about Thornton is that the Court views
Article I, Section 5 as being an exclusive grant of power to the House
to determine the qualifications of its membership. 41 Similarly, Article
I, Section 3 was viewed as an exclusive and express delegation to the
states to elect Senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment. 42 The fact that the states could not add to the
qualifications of their representatives in the House delegations
because of the exclusivity of this provision and the fact that Congress
could not add to the qualifications of duly appointed senators because
states had the power to select them demonstrate how each polity has
the final policymaking authority in its respective area. The Elections
Clause, on the other hand, gives the final policymaking authority over
congressional elections to Congress with no provision that a similar
power be given to the states.
Along these lines, the Court has interpreted the states'
Elections Clause power as being limited to procedural regulations but
has not articulated similar limitations on Congress's veto power. In
Cook v. Gralike, the Court invalidated a Missouri constitutional
provision, Amendment 8, that instructed each member of Missouri's
congressional delegation to work to pass a term-limits amendment
138. Id. at 808-09.
139. Id. at 805 ("[I]n certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the
federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution.
Thus, we have noted that 'while, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in
Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states ....
this statement is true
only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as
provided by § 2 of Art. I.' ") (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)).
140. Id. at 811.
141. Id. at 804.
142. Id. at 804 n.16.
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once elected or have the statement "Disregarded Voters' Instruction on
Term Limits" printed next to his or her name on the primary and
general election ballot. 143 The Court rejected Amendment 8 on the
grounds that it was an attempt to dictate a specific substantive
outcome-a constitutional amendment for term limits-rather than a
procedural regulation that fell properly within the scope of the states'
Elections Clause authority. 44 The Court's view that the states'
Elections Clause authority is confined to procedural regulations
illustrates the limited nature of state power and undermines any
notion that it conveys "sovereignty" upon the states over the matter of
145
elections.
Moreover, sovereignty is not required in order for the states to
exercise significant and effective power over elections, particularly
where Congress has not acted. In an earlier piece, I suggested that
Congress's failure to exercise its veto power over partisan
gerrymandering allowed the states to use their redistricting authority
in a profederalism manner. 146 Thus, state autonomy can thrive and,
indeed, mimic sovereignty where Congress has not acted, but
otherwise the states are limited in their ability to regulate their
electoral mechanisms by Congress's express veto.
Because the Elections Clause is not a federalism provision, and
instead concerns decentralization and autonomy, the Court is
obligated to defer to Congress where it has exercised its "veto power"
over the states. Such deference is also warranted where Congress has
acted pursuant to other provisions, such as the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments, in light of the fact that these provisions
redefined the relationship between the state and federal governments
to give the latter more authority with respect to regulating the
franchise. 147 Thus, the fact that the Elections Clause does not give
Congress a veto over pure state election practices does not preclude

143. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 514 (2001).
144. Id. at 523 (" '[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to
issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor
or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.' ") (citing
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833-34).
145. See id. at 527 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Elections Clause thus delegates but
limited power over federal elections to the States.").
146. See generally Tolson, supra note 21.
147. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) ("[O]f course, the States have no
power to grant or withhold the franchise on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution."). See generally Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 344-46 (1880) (explaining that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were
intended to be "limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congrese
[sic]").
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congressional authority to intervene. The Court has also recognized
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as express limitations on
the states' authority over elections; 48 thus, congressional actions
pursuant to these provisions also represent a type of "veto power" over
state electoral authority.
B. Cementing CongressionalSovereignty: The Civil War Amendments
As the preceding sections show, the lack of state sovereignty
over elections is consistent with both the constitutional text and
history, but this delegation of state sovereignty to the federal
government extends beyond the provisions of the Elections Clause.
The Civil War amendments also represent the specific intention of the
framers of those amendments to expand federal power at the expense
of state sovereignty. 149 Although the Elections Clause speaks only to
the election of "Senators and Representatives," the Civil War
amendments extend Congress's authority to regulate state electoral
practices that implicate the constitutional right to vote as protected by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 150 In Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections,1'5 the Court invalidated a state poll tax
under the Equal Protection Clause, holding that the right of suffrage
"is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not
discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that
Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has
imposed."' 5 2 Because Congress has the ability to enforce the mandates
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Harperillustrates that
this power extends to preventing states from engaging in electoral
practices that discriminate against voters on the basis of race, even if
the practices used pertain only to state elections. 53 Thus, in South
148. See infra Part II.B.
149. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (noting that the Civil War
amendments "were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on
state sovereignty").
150. The Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments, are also arguably a source of congressional authority, but are beyond the scope of
this Article. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend.

XXVI.
151. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
152. Id. at 665.
153. Compare Harper, 383 U.S. 663, with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
superseded in part by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (finding that
Congress cannot set the voting age in state and local elections). Oregon v. Mitchell is not
inapposite here, given that Congress made no findings that the twenty-one-year-old voting age
requirement was used by states to disenfranchise voters on the basis of race. As the Court noted,
the enforcement powers were intended to help fulfill the framers' goal of "ending racial
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Carolinav. Katzenbach, the Court upheld provisions of the VRA that
prohibited the use of literacy tests in all elections, noting that these
tests had been commonly used to contravene the requirements of the
Fifteenth Amendment and therefore could be banned. 154 As the Court
later recognized, "[T]he original design of the Founding Fathers was
altered by the Civil War Amendments and various other amendments
to the Constitution," and these changes were "intended to deny to the
States the power to discriminate against persons on account of their
race."155
Until recently, the Court had taken a broad view of Congress's
enforcement power pursuant to these amendments.1 56 The Court
recognized that these provisions gave Congress power that had once
been reserved to the states-a delegation, in effect, of some of the
states' residual sovereignty. As such, Congress was entitled to
deference and significant leeway when it acted pursuant to these
amendments. But the Court's recent interpretation of congressional
power in cases like City of Boerne v. Flores157 and Seminole Tribe v.
1 58 finds that congressional authority must yield to concerns of
Florida
state sovereignty, which misallocates power between the states and
the federal government.
Initially, the Court took a broad view of Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In City of Rome v.
United States, for example, the Court rejected the argument that
Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment was
limited to remedying only purposeful discrimination, noting that "even
if [Section] 2 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any
argument that Congress may not, pursuant to [Section] 2, outlaw
voting practices that are discriminatory in effect."1 69 The Court further
observed that Congress may pass legislation under Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment in order to prohibit acts that do not violate
discrimination and [preventing] direct or indirect state legislative encroachment on the rights
guaranteed by the amendments," 400 U.S. at 127, and Congress failed to link the regulation to
discrimination based on race.
154. 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(upholding provision of the VRA that outlawed an English literacy requirement as a condition for
voting, even though the law conflicted with regulations for state and local elections in noncovered
states).
155. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 126.
156. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). But see The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
157. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
158. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

159. 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980).
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section 1 of the Act, "so long as the prohibitions attacking racial
discrimination in voting are 'appropriate,' as that term is defined in
160
McCulloch v.Maryland."'
The Court has described Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment as broader than the judicial power to define
the substantive reach of its provisions. 161 In Katzenbach v. Morgan,
the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the
Amendment would be upheld
so long as the Court could find that the enactment 'is plainly adapted to [the] end' of
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and 'is not prohibited by but is consistent with
'the letter and spirit of the constitution' regardless of whether the practices outlawed by
Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection Clause. 162

In effect, the Court has interpreted Congress's enforcement
powers as "no less broad than its authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause," capable of addressing state action that has a
discriminatory purpose, that has a discriminatory effect, and that may
63
not even violate the substantive provisions of the Amendments. 1 And
164 Congress's
given the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
power to renew the VRA should be beyond question.
Moreover, state sovereign immunity is not a limit on the reach
of this authority. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, for example, the Court
explicitly held that Congress can use its Fourteenth Amendment
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick, like City of
Rome and Katzenbach, recognized that the Civil War amendments
altered the preexisting power constructs. As the Court observed,
Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism
that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are
enforce the Civil War
necessarily overridden by the power 1 to
65
Amendments "by appropriate legislation.'
The Fitzpatrick plaintiffs argued that provisions of
Connecticut's retirement plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment. 166 At issue
was whether Congress could award backpay as a remedy under Title

160. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
161. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (recognizing Congress's power
under the Fifteenth Amendment to pass the VRA but seeing no need to overrule its own contrary
precedents).
162. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 176 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641 (1996)).
163. Id. at 175.
164. See generally United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (discussing the breadth
of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
165. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
166. Id. at 448.
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VII for state employees pursuant to its enforcement power under the
167
Fourteenth Amendment.
In finding that Congress can authorize private suits against
the states, the Court noted that the Civil War amendments
represented a "carving out" of state sovereignty-that these
amendments are an "expansion of Congress'[s] powers with [a]
corresponding diminution of state sovereignty," a reduction in power
that extends to the principle of state sovereignty embodied by the
Eleventh Amendment. 168 Thus, there is nothing wrong with Congress's
decision to use its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to
provide a remedy for private individuals against state action, even if
69
such a remedy interferes with state sovereignty.1
The Court's recent attempts to require an expansive
evidentiary record in support of the VRA are contrary to this broad
view of Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments embraced shortly after the Act was adopted.
Recent case law represents an inexplicable departure from this earlier
precedent.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court substantially narrowed
Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. At
issue was the refusal of city authorities to grant a building permit to
the regional Catholic archbishop to enlarge a church building that had
been designated a historic landmark. 17 0 The archbishop claimed that
this refusal violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA"), which prohibited government from " 'substantially
burdening' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability" and subjected such laws to strict
scrutiny. 171 In passing RFRA, Congress relied on its enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the rationale that

167. Id. at 452.
168. Id. at 455 ("Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a
corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.").
169. Id. at 454-55 ("[I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which
the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. . . . Nor can she deny to the general
government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full
enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted."). But see Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding that Congress could not lower the minimum age of
voters from twenty-one to eighteen in state and local elections because the Constitution explicitly
delegated this function to the states).
170. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (evaluating a city ordinance that
required preapproval for all construction affecting historic landmarks and buildings).
171. Id. at 515-16.
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it was protecting one of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
172
Amendment.
Congress passed RFRA in order to overturn a Supreme Court
decision, Employment Division v. Smith, which held that rational
basis review applied to laws of general applicability that infringe on a
person's exercise of religion. 173 The fact that RFRA increased the level
of scrutiny for laws of general applicability beyond that required by
Smith led the Court to conclude that RFRA was not a proper exercise
of Congress's enforcement powers because it did not deter or remedy a
constitutional violation. 174 Instead, Congress was trying to make it
more difficult for states to defend laws that would be constitutional
under the Court's jurisprudence.
According to the Court, Congress could not use its section 5
power to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the states" because "[1]egislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause."' 75 In other words, Congress's enforcement powers are limited
to remedial fixes and do not include the ability to make substantive
changes to the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 In order to
distinguish Congress's remedial power from acts that make a
substantive change in the governing law, Boerne established that
to
"there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
77
end."'
that
to
adopted
means
the
and
remedied
or
be prevented
RFRA could be perceived as an attempt by Congress to redefine
an aspect of the state's relationship with its citizens. From this
perspective, this case looks strikingly like the Civil Rights Cases,
where the Court invalidated provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
on the grounds that the states are the primary protectors of civil
172. Id. at 519-20.
173. Id. at 512-16.
174. Id. at 519.
175. Id. (arguing that Congress "does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is").
176. Id. at 520.
177. Id. at 519-20. The Court later expounded on the congruence and proportionality test.
See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Congress could not subject states to suits under
Title I of the American with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress could not subject states to suits under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Congress could not subject states to suits for patent
infringement). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Pitts, supra note
30, at 247 (arguing that "the most important contribution Hibbs made to the congruence and
proportionality body of jurisprudence is that the [Supreme] Court somewhat lessened Congress's
burden to prove a widespread pattern of recent constitutional violations to justify a prophylactic
remedy").
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rights. 178 In the interest of preserving state sovereignty, Congress can
intervene only if the states default on their obligation. A second-and
equally plausible-interpretation is that RFRA was an attempt by a
democratically elected body to play a role in defining the scope of
constitutional rights, consistent with its duty to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court believed that Congress, since
it is democratically elected, should play a much more limited role in
179
constitutional interpretation.
Regardless of which view of RFRA one endorses, however, the
holding of Boerne is in obvious tension with the Court's earlier
interpretation of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment
as being broad enough to enforce remedies that arguably interfere
with state sovereignty 80 and to prohibit acts that do not necessarily
violate Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 ' More pointedly, if
Congress can enforce a remedy against an act that does not violate
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is a bit of a stretch to say
182
that Congress is not allowed to make substantive changes as well.
Congress makes substantive changes whenever it prevents states from
engaging in acts that are otherwise constitutional under the
83
Fourteenth Amendment.
By comparison, the VRA, by requiring that all state laws (even
those that are not discriminatory or have not historically been used to
perpetuate discrimination) be precleared in order to go into effect, is a
clear example of Congress prohibiting acts that are otherwise
constitutional. A general rule of preclearance, however, arguably
furthers the mandates of the substantive provisions of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 84
Notably, the Boerne Court concluded that Congress's power to
enforce equality in voting pursuant to the VRA of 1965 was
appropriate because of the history of voting discrimination in this
178. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
179. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 865 (1999).
180. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976).
181. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980).
182. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111HAR. L. REV. 153, 171 (1997).
183. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) ("While the line between
measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide
latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed.").
184. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966) (rejecting the argument that
section 5 of the VRA is too broad on the grounds that experience has taught Congress that a
more narrow rule would not work).
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country and the fact that the Act's most stringent provisions were
limited to the most flagrant offenders.1 8 5 This interpretation of the
186
Act, based on geography and history, is particularly problematic,
but it stems from an artificial and judicially created limitation on
Congress's ability to enforce equality in elections that originated in
Katzenbach. The early VRA cases are unusual in that they recognized
that Congress had extensive authority over elections and deferred to
Congress's determinations about what measures were needed to
combat discrimination in voting. But then the Court simultaneously
limited this power by suggesting that a strong legislative record is
needed in order to justify this "extraordinary legislation otherwise
18 7
unfamiliar to our federal system."
In Katzenbach, the Court dealt specifically with the argument
that the VRA exceeded the powers of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment and encroached on an area reserved to the states by the
Constitution. 188 The Court noted the extensive and pervasive history
of voting discrimination in this country, the fact that Congress had
tried to fix the problem on a case-by-case basis, and the persistence of
voting discrimination in this country despite these efforts.18 9 These
factual findings allowed it to conclude that the VRA was an
appropriate use of Congress's enforcement authority under the
Fifteenth Amendment. 190 The Court found that "[a]s against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting." 19 Thus, the Court did not dispute that the ability to regulate

185. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525.
186. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 743-44 (2008) ("Although Justice Kennedy referred favorably to
the Voting Rights Act seven times in his [Boerne] opinion, contrasting the record of widespread
and persisting racial discrimination that supported the passage of the VRA with the lack of
'examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry' in
the past forty years to buttress the RFRA, voting rights supporters worried, and opponents
hoped, that the Court would demand an overwhelming record of widespread, quite-recent racial
discrimination in voting to justify a 2007 renewal.") (internal citations omitted).
187. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 308-14 ("Despite the earnest efforts of the Justice Department and of many
federal judges, these new laws have done little to cure the problem of voting discrimination.
According to estimates by the Attorney General during hearings on the Act, registration of
voting-age Negroes in Alabama rose only from 14.2% to 19.4% between 1958 and 1964; in
Louisiana it barely inched ahead from 31.7% to 31.8% between 1956 and 1965; and in
Mississippi it increased only from 4.4% to 6.4% between 1954 and 1964.").
190. See id. at 326 (noting that "Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting").
191. Id. at 324.
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their electoral machinery is part of the reserved power of the states;
rather, Congress's power trumps when state power is exercised in a
92
manner contrary to the Constitution.1
The problem is that the Court's narrow view of congressional
power as being limited to instances when a state explicitly attempts to
circumvent the Constitution ignores that Congress, through its veto
power under the Elections Clause, is not so limited. Recall that during
the ratification debates, the framers rejected limiting constructions of
the congressional veto under the Elections Clause. Besides the
examples noted in Part II, other examples abound. Virginia, for
example, proposed the following:
Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding
elections for senators and representatives, or either of them, except when the legislature
of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled, by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the
same. 193

Yet this proposed modification and others were rejected. The
framers anticipated that Congress's authority over elections would be
kept in check through normal politics. 194 Thus, the Court's view in
Katzenbach that Congress may act with regard to elections only if the
states circumscribe the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment is not
only misguided and erroneous, but it is also inconsistent with the
constitutional text and history.
Katzenbach is also an example in which the Court conflates
autonomy
with state sovereignty. It is true that the states have
state
broad power to regulate suffrage 195 and that Congress has broad
authority to intervene in state electoral processes to enforce the
dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment, as the Court assumes.' 96 But
because of the Elections Clause, congressional authority is not limited
to the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment, where the Court has
restricted Congress's enforcement authority to enacting remedial

192. Id. at 325 ("When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it
is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state
power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.") (quoting
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
193. Amendments to the Constitution, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 100, at 224 (June 27, 1788); see also The
Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

DEBATES, supra note 100, at 244-45 (Dec. 18, 1787) (expressing concern that Congress's ability to
alter the time, place, and manner of elections will lead to "life-estates in government").
194. Tolson, supra note 21, at 864-65 (discussing controversy over congressional
reapportionment acts).
195. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325.
196. Id. at 325-26.
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legislation. 19 7 The veto power gives Congress broad authority to
mechanisms beyond the Fifteenth
regulate state electoral
Amendment's dictates.
The Katzenbach Court, although ostensibly upholding the VRA,
created a dangerous precedent. Indeed, the Court could not foresee
that the legitimacy of the VRA would be called into question if
Congress did not make factual findings similar to those that originally
198
sustained the Act.
Initially, the Justices were willing to endorse a broad reading
of the Act. In Allen v. State Board of Elections, for example, the Court
found that the VRA required that every change to a state's election
laws had to be submitted for preclearance because even minor changes
could be used to deny citizens the right to vote.199 But this very broad
reading, with the clear implication that the Act would extend to
situations heretofore unimagined, has not had the precedential force
that it could have had because of the initial limitations laid out by the
Katzenbach Court. The Court's decision to confine the discussion of the
Act's constitutionality to the Fifteenth Amendment; its finding that
congressional authority over elections is limited to the Fifteenth
Amendment; its determination that this authority is exceptional and
uncommon; and, finally, its conclusion that the use of this power can
only be justified by an extensive factual record have played a far more
prominent role in the Court's recent interpretation of the Act.
Despite Allen's broad reading of the VRA, what carried the day
was the Katzenbach Court's failure to recognize that Congress's ability
to intervene in state electoral processes is a part of its sovereign
authority in this area. Continuing to ignore that the states delegated
their final policymaking authority over elections with the adoption of
the Constitution and their subsequent ratification of the Civil War
amendments, the Roberts Court has deferred to state sovereignty in
ways that are clearly inconsistent with both the constitutional text
and history, as well as with the Court's own precedent.

197. See id.
198. Compare Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511-12 (2009)
(questioning continued constitutionality of some sections of the VRA), with United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-17 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not giving
Congress "a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce" and asserting that the standard to be
applied is akin to rational basis review), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1982)
(applying rational basis review to congressional findings).
199. 393 U.S. 544, 565-67 (1969).
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III. DISTINGUISHING SOVEREIGNTY FROM AUTONOMY IN FEDERALISM
THEORY: A THEORY OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE

Figuring out the meaning of the Elections Clause requires us to
determine where the Clause-and, by implication, the VRA-fits in
our larger system of federalism. Part III.A begins by defining
sovereignty, which is at the core of this Article's theory of the
Elections Clause. Part III.B shows how the Court's focus on state
sovereignty has obscured the fact that the Clause is about
decentralization, not about federalism. Finally, this Article concludes
that this misunderstanding about the nature of state sovereignty has
led the Court to employ a general federalism norm that has
inappropriately and illegitimately rendered section 5 of the Act
constitutionally suspect.
A. Defining Sovereignty: Using Final PolicymakingAuthority as a
Baseline
Generally speaking, the tension between finding substantive
limitations on congressional authority and developing doctrine that
follows from the constitutional text and history has led to many fits
and starts in the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. 20 0 In
reality, the Court has a definitional problem that makes policing
federalism difficult and bleeds over into its analysis of the Elections
Clause. Namely, what is sovereignty? Or more specifically, what does
sovereignty mean in the context of the Elections Clause?
While sovereignty is certainly not an undisputed concept in
law, history, political science, political theory, or any other
discipline, 2° 1 it does have some baseline features that the Court can

200. See Rapaczynski, supra note 19, at 342 (observing that "the Court's attempts to impose
federalism-related limitations on the national government have been, throughout history,
frustrated by the political process, resulting three times in constitutional amendments").
201. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL 84 (2d ed. Ballyntyne Press 1886) (1660) (arguing
that in exchange for internal order and protection from outside threats, man is obligated to obey
the sovereign unconditionally); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 149 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690) (maintaining that government's sovereign
authority is limited by the rights of its subjects with recourse for rights violations being available
in the form of rebellion or judicial action). Even though Locke believed that the people could rise
up against a sovereign who abuses his authority, Locke recognized that the properly exercised
power of the sovereign is supreme, or final:
Though in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting
according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there
can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and
must be subordinate; yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain
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draw on in articulating federalism doctrine-notably, the finality or
20 2
supremacy of sovereign authority.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines sovereignty as
"supreme power, especially over a body politic." 20 3 Similarly, Andrzej
Rapaczynski has described sovereignty as both a descriptive theory
that "in every actual political society there exists de facto an ultimate
source of authority, legal or political," and a normative theory that
"there ought to be such an authority."20 4 In his view, "sovereignty"
requires, at a minimum level, three things:
(1) A sovereign must be sovereign (have authority) over someone and something (that is,
there must be subjects and a domain over which the sovereign rules); (2) the authority of
a sovereign over the subjects within the sovereign's domain must be of a political nature
(that is, at a minimum, the types of commands issued by the sovereign must be capable
of acquiring a legal status and be backed by an appropriate enforcement mechanism);
and (3) the authority of a sovereign must be final (that is, the sovereign cannot in turn
be dependent on another person or institution, and there is no further recourse for
subjects who are not prepared to obey the sovereign's commands). 205

Thus, the supremacy of the higher authority, and the finality
accorded to its dictates, are the hallmarks of "sovereignty," even if
there may be some disagreement as to what rights individuals and
subunits have against this center. Contrary to these definitions, the
Justices often divide over how much deference to show federal law
that affects the ability of states to set their own regulatory policy, even
if the states' sovereign authority is not directly implicated.206 The

ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.
Id.
202. Robert Lansing, A Definition of Sovereignty, 10 PROC. AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N 61, 64 (1913)
("We think of sovereignty-and I mean by 'we' mankind in general-as the supreme and vital
element in a political state, without which it cannot exist in an organized form or possess those
other attributes, which enter into the concept of a state."); Hans J. Morgenthau, The Problem of
Sovereignty Reconsidered, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 341 (1948) ("When the conception of
sovereignty was first developed in the latter part of the sixteenth century with reference to the
new phenomenon of the territorial state, it referred in legal terms to the elemental political fact
of that age, namely, the appearance of a centralized power which exercised its law making and
law enforcing authority within a certain territory. This power, vested at that time primarily, but
not necessarily, in an absolute monarch, was superior to the other forces which made themselves
felt within that territory, and after a century was unchallengeable either from within or from
without. In other words, it was supreme."). But see David G. Ritchie, On the Conception of
Sovereignty, 1 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 385, 397 (1891) (discussing the argument that
Congress and the states are "non-sovereign" because the Constitution can be amended).
203. Sovereignty, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
sovereignty?show=0&t=1307124357 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
204. Rapaczynski, supranote 19, at 347.
205. Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
206. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S 366, 420 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in
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their
Court often confuses the states' sovereign authority with
20 7
autonomous power to operate in a specific regulatory area.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "autonomy" as "the
quality or state of being self-governing." 20 8 With autonomy, there is
significant authority to act-hence the focus on self-government-but
that authority is not generally viewed as final. 20 9 Autonomy embraces
the idea that there are some regulatory areas in which the states are
immune from federal norms. 2 10 Since sovereignty can also embrace
this principle of immunity,211 there is considerable overlap between
2 12
the two terms in federalism theory.
Sovereignty and autonomy also are frequently conflated
because not only do the two terms overlap, but sovereignty is a
21 3
somewhat vacuous term, and its meaning is often driven by context.
In the case law, the meaning of "sovereignty" is either implied or
inferred from the constitutional structure and text, or it is defined by
negative implication from the powers granted to the states or the
21 4
federal government.
The defining characteristic of sovereignty, and what
distinguishes it from autonomy, is finality in decisionmaking by the
supreme authority. This basic distinction between sovereignty and
autonomy helps us to determine how the state and federal
governments stand in relation to each other over the matter of

part and dissenting in part) ("[W]e are to interpret statutes . . . based on the assumption that
Congress intended to preserve local authority."); Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
844-45 (1976).
207. Young, supra note 82, at 13.
208. Autonomy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
autonomy?show=O&t=1307125878 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
209. Young, supra note 82, at 14-15 (describing autonomy as "emphasiz[ing] the positive use
of governmental authority, rather than the unaccountability of the government itself' although
noting that autonomy is sometimes used to refer to the quality of being governed by one's own
laws and no other higher authority).
210. Compare id. at 3-4 (defining sovereignty as "the notion that state governments should
be unaccountable for violations of federal norms" and autonomy as "the ability of states to
govern"), with Hills, supra note 15, at 816 (defining autonomy as immunity from federal norms).
211. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999).
212. Young, supra note 82, at 14-15 (noting that sovereignty and autonomy both suggest
"the ability to do things with power" and also that "[m]any actions that affect state sovereignty
will impinge on state autonomy").
213. Rapaczynski, supra note 19, at 351 ("[So long as some domain of state power can be
meaningfully identified, even if a state is not itself free to change it, the idea of state sovereignty
does not lose all of its utility. The real problem is that even a moderately searching scrutiny of
the powers of the federal government shows that the alleged existence of a residual category of
exclusive state powers over any private, nongovernmental activity is in fact illusory.").
214. See supra note 16.
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elections. In particular, if we focus on finality and treat this as the
core of authority for the Elections Clause, it becomes easier to see how
sovereignty is a factor that must be considered in allocating authority
215
over elections.
Defining sovereignty is an attempt, even by those who reject
sovereignty as the core of federalism, to understand what "power"
states and their citizens retain postratification. 2 16 The Elections
Clause is most easily understood as juxtaposition between sovereignty
and autonomy. Sovereignty requires a level of decisionmaking that is
insulated from disruption. The Clause, therefore, cannot be
understood without referencing this absence of sovereignty or the lack
of final policymaking authority on the part of the states. 2 17 States have
significant authority over elections that, over time, has grown into a
strong autonomy that the Court has come to equate with sovereignty.
Yet Congress's ability to modify, alter, or change state law prevents
even the strongest account of autonomy from being equal to sovereign
authority. 218 Congress's ability to change state law is the power to
press uniformity with respect to a particular electoral rule. 21 9 This is
contrary to the following values of federalism often touted by
proponents of state sovereignty: citizen participation, regulatory
diversity, and experimentation. 220

215. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 1167 ("[G]overnments are distinguished by their
acknowledged, lawful authority-not dependent on property ownership-to coerce a territorially
defined and imperfectly voluntary membership by acts of regulation, taxation, and
condemnation, the exercise of which authority is determined by majoritarian and representative
procedures.").
216. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 15 ("Process federalists emphatically resist the separate
spheres approach that is so often paired with sovereignty. They rightly point out that it is
exceedingly difficult to draw the line between state and federal functions. Yet floating in the
background of their work is a similar conception of state power-the sense that states should
have de facto autonomy over 'their' policies."); Young, supra note 82, at 52 (noting that
"autonomy, not sovereignty" better promotes the values of federalism because "[just having state
governments is not enough; those governments need to have meaningful things to do. Federalism
cannot provide regulatory diversity unless states have autonomy to set divergent policies; state
governments cannot provide fora for political participation and competition unless meaningful
decisions are being made in those fora.").
217. Ernest Young, for example, has argued that sovereignty has to do with political
accountability, a factor which by definition requires final policymaking authority in order for
voters to know who to blame for perceived or actual governmental shortcomings. Young, supra
note 82, at 59; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (arguing that political
accountability is a value of federalism).
218. Young, supra note 82, at 30-31.
219. Congress has used its power to regulate elections and reduce gerrymandering by
passing the Apportionment Acts of 1842, 1862, and 1901, which initially instituted requirements
of contiguity, compactness, and population equality. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004).
220. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Young, supra note 82, at 163.
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The Court perceives the states' power under the Elections
Clause as the creation of a powerful interest or right in the states
against the federal government. It does so in the name of promoting
the "values" of federalism and characterizes this power as a part of
state sovereignty, ignoring that Congress still has substantial
authority to intervene through the Clause (its veto power) and other
provisions (the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). Equating
sovereignty with autonomy, a mistake that the Court has made in
other areas of its jurisprudence, perpetuates the confusion.
In Printz v. United States, for example, the Court found that
Congress could not direct state law-enforcement officers to participate
in a federally enacted regulatory scheme on the grounds that "laws
conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty and are thus not in
accord with the Constitution." 221 Printz, however, had more to do with
political considerations rather than any concerns about state
sovereignty. 222 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed the
following:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And
even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal
put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness
program, they are 2 still
23
and for its defects.

This concern about political accountability-and Congress's
ability to force the states to internalize the political and economic
costs of administering federal programs-reflects "a distortion in the
ordinary political process that we generally count on to protect state
autonomy. ''224 Thus, Printz articulates an anti-commandeering rule
225
that, according to Professor Young, seeks to correct this distortion.
Couching the issue in terms of dual sovereignty rather than in terms
of process correction, however, obscures the fact that the Printz
decision actually does nothing to prevent Congress from preempting
state and local laws thereby achieving the same result condemned in
226
the decision.
221. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997).
222. Hills, supra note 15, at 820.
223. Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
224. Young, supra note 82, at 128.
225. Id.
226. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 ("But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct
the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty, such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate. It is the very principle of separate state
sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect."); see also Hills, supra note 15, at 822 ("Seen against a
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In reality, Printzs anti-commandeering rule-which suggests
immunity from federal norms in the interest of preserving political
accountability-and Congress's final policymaking authority over a
particular policy area are not the same thing.227 Congress can still act
to preempt, modify, or alter state power in other ways and, as a result,
state decisionmaking lacks the finality that defines true sovereignty.
Neither notions of political accountability nor determinations of
the rights of subunits against the center are integral or unique to any
notion of sovereignty and can just as easily be at issue if the state has
autonomy in a particular policy sphere. 22 8 Thus, the lesson of Printz,
particularly for the Court's interpretation of the VRA, is that even if
the Court conceives of state sovereignty as a proxy for political
accountability, as it does in Printz, this value is adequately protected
by the fact that states draw the lines for congressional representatives
in the first instance. 229 This power is sufficient to protect the
autonomy interest that states have over elections even if it would be
insufficient had state sovereignty really been at issue. Printz is a clear
example of the Court conflating sovereignty with autonomy, a mistake
that has bled over into its voting rights jurisprudence.
B. UnderstandingSovereignty: Federalism,Decentralization,and the
Illegitimacy of the FederalismNorm
As the prior sections show, the Court ignores that the Elections
Clause gives the states strong autonomy power over elections and
leaves sovereignty with Congress. The organizational structure of the
Clause itself is not really federalist, but reflects a decentralized
organizational structure that is often confused with federalism.
As Professors Feeley and Rubin have argued, "federalism
grants subunits of government a final say in certain areas of

background of almost unlimited national powers to regulate private persons directly, New York
and Printz present something of a paradox: Why give state governments the right to withhold
their regulatory processes while simultaneously giving the state governments nothing to
regulate with those processes?").
227. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4 (noting that "recognition of [state] immunity from private suit may
encourage Congress to subject the states to other, more intrusive means of ensuring compliance
with federal law").
228. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992); Young, supranote 82, at 127.
229. Tolson, supra note 21, at 860 (arguing that the states' redistricting authority under the
Elections Clause is a way for the states to wield influence with their congressional delegation
and therefore protect their regulatory authority).
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governance,"' 230 whereas in a decentralized regime "the central
government decides how decisionmaking authority will be divided
between itself and the geographical subunits."2 31 Decentralization is
the best way of describing a policy area in which states are
autonomous rather than sovereign-where they may be immune from
certain norms but are not exempt from all intervention from the
federal government. As such, the ability of Congress to preempt state
regulatory regimes reflects that the founders were not overly
concerned with protecting state sovereignty in this respect because, if
this had been a concern, state authority would be final.
The distinction between autonomy and sovereignty is an
important one because, as Printz shows, the creation of a powerful
interest in the state, such as the ability to create the time, place, and
manner of elections, means little if the final authority to preempt the
entire field ultimately lies with Congress. The anti-commandeering
rule is based on the notion that Congress should carry out federal
responsibilities itself because state officials cannot be trusted, a view
that has its antecedents in the previously discussed theories of dual
sovereignty. 232 But because Congress can preempt the field entirely,
there is very little about the anti-commandeering rule that is
reflective of federalism. 233 For these same reasons, the time, place, and
manner provision, also subject to the whims of Congress, is not really
federalist either.
The Court's clear statement rule is another instance where the
Court's characterization does not accurately capture the nature of our
system. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court held that Missouri's
mandatory retirement age for state judges did not violate the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") because Congress did
not clearly express its intention to apply the ADEA to state court
judges. 234 The Court focused on the need for a clear statement from
Congress because "congressional interference with the Missouri
people's decision to establish a qualification for their judges would
230. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 100, at 20; see also id. at 16 ("[Tjhe subunits must exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over some set of issues; that is, there must be some types of decisions that
are reserved to the subsidiary governmental units and that the central government may not
displace or countermand.").
231. Id. at 21.
232. Hills, supra note 15, at 842 (arguing that "[tihe legacy of dual federalism that Justice
Scalia invokes [in Printz] is, indeed, a nationalistic legacy, forged by the Marshall Court and
carried forward by Justice Story out of distrust for state institutions rather than love of state
autonomy").
233. Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 1629, 1673 (2006).
234. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers." 23 5
The presumption is that the ability to determine the qualifications of
their government officials is integral to states' "sovereignty." However,
by allowing for the possibility that Congress can abrogate state
sovereign immunity with a clear statement of its intention to do so,
the Court implicitly held that the state is not truly sovereign in this
236
sphere because its decisions are not final.
The Gregory Court's a priori references to "sovereignty" were
further confused by the Court's discussion of the merits of federalism
as a justification for its clear statement rule. Justice O'Connor argued
that the clear statement rule furthers the principal benefits of a
federalist system, which include checking abuses of government
power; ensuring a "decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; increase[ing]
the opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
allow[ing] for more innovation and experimentation in government;
and mak[ing] government more responsive by putting the States in
23 7
competition for a more mobile citizenry."
The states do not necessarily have to be "sovereign," however,
in order to promote these values. As Professors Feeney and Rubin
point out, the distinction between federalism and decentralization is
particularly salient whenever the Court attempts to justify federalism
as an ideal governing structure based on values that are not unique to
federal systems. 238 Thus, Gregory and its discussion of the merits of
federalism are misleading in part because the state is not truly
sovereign with respect to determining the qualifications of its
government officials, and the exhaustive list of federalism's values
does little to change this fact. Instead, the states are autonomous with
respect to the qualifications of their state officials so long as Congress
does not issue a clear statement that it is abrogating state sovereign

235. Id. at 463 (arguing that states have the authority to "determine the qualifications of
their most important government officials" and it is "an authority that lies at the 'heart of
representative government'").
236. Id. at 463-64, 468 (noting that the "authority of the people of the States to determine
the qualifications of their government officials is, of course, not without limit" and pointing to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause as potential limitations).
237. Id. at 458.
238. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 22-24; see also id. at 18 ("Different modes of
governance should be described by different terms, and arguments in favor of each one should be
based on its own distinctive features, not merged with other arguments through verbal
obfuscation.").
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The states' power in Gregory is best explained by

decentralization, which means that state law governs unless Congress
indicates its intention to displace it.
1. Federalism vs. Decentralization: Defining the Federalism Norm
This distinction between federalism and decentralization has
significant implications for the VRA, where the Court has
characterized state sovereignty as encompassing a broad authority for
states to regulate their electoral machinery. 240 In pursuing this end,
the Court, as with Gregory's clear statement rule and Printz's anticommandeering rule, has employed a general federalism norm to an
area that is governed by a provision-the Elections Clause-that is
not distinctly federalist.
The federalism norm, according to John Manning, refers to a
nontextual, free-floating conception of the state/federal balance of
241
power that the Court uses to police the boundaries of federalism.
This norm emerged during the "federalism revolution" of the

239. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcom M. Feeley, Federalism and Interpretation,PUBLIUS,
Spring 2008, at 175 ("Autonomy necessarily implies multiple decision makers and permits each
decision maker to set its own goals in the areas where such autonomy prevails.").
240. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1972) ("Unless Congress acts, Art. I, § 4
empowers the States to regulate the conduct of senatorial elections."); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 123 (1970) ("In short, the Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws
regarding national elections, but provided that if Congress became dissatisfied with the state
laws, Congress could alter them. A newly created national government could hardly have been
expected to survive without the ultimate power to rule itself and to fill its offices under its own
laws."); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) ("It cannot be doubted that [the] comprehensive
words [of the Elections Clause] embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of
voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the
numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in
order to enforce the fundamental right involved.").
241. See John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation,122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2008 (2009) (criticizing the federalism norm); Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme
Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999) (attempting to
find a textual basis for state immunities from federal law due to the Court's inability to derive
these immunities from the text). Others have looked to political theory and pragmatic concerns
to justify an expansive federalism doctrine. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the
Jurisprudenceof Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1604 (2000) ("By linking the Framers'
original understandings of the Constitution's structure to broader aspects of political theory, the
'big ideas' approach [to federalism] offers recourse to sources that may offer determinate answers
when more familiar sources, such as text and specific history, run out."); id. at 1637 (discussing
Justice Black's and Justice O'Connor's pragmatic approaches to federalism); see also CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 8-22 (1969) (discussing the
extratextual basis for federalism).
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Rehnquist era, a series of cases in which the Court held that there are
constitutional limitations to the exercise of federal authority over the
states. 242 United States. v. Lopez, for example, was the first time in
decades that the Court invalidated a federal statute as exceeding the
243
scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.
Recent cases have extended the limitations on congressional
power beyond the text to both structural and historical arguments
about the boundaries of federal authority. 24 4 Notably, in Alden v.
Maine, the majority focused on this idea of a "free-floating" federalism,
which is a concept of state sovereignty that extends beyond the
boundaries of the Tenth Amendment. 245 As a result, Congress cannot
subject nonconsenting states to private suit and, in effect, abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 246 The Court found that this sovereignty

242. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Congress exceeded scope of its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating state sovereign immunity
under the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress's commerce powers); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not a congruent
and proportional remedy under Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress's Commerce Clause authority does not extend to abrogating state
sovereign immunity in court); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that
Congress may not commandeer the legislative processes of the states by compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)
(holding that the ADEA did not prohibit a state from instituting a mandatory retirement age for
its state court judges). But see Matthew Adler, State Sovereign Immunity and the AntiCommandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sd., Mar. 2001, at 158, 163 (noting
that the Constitution has very few state sovereignty constraints, and as a result, "Congress is
constitutionally permitted to exercise its commerce clause powers in a way that changes the
structure of state government, sets the qualifications for state officers, and so forth; the states
are not shielded from these outcomes by constitutional guarantees, but rather by the structure of
the national political process, which makes such outcomes unlikely").
243. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal gun control statute as beyond Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause); see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the
National Industrial Recovery Act on commerce clause grounds); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918) (Congress exceeded its commerce clause power by enacting legislation excluding the
products of child labor from interstate commerce). During this time, the Court routinely struck
down progressive legislation on a number of grounds. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking down a state minimum wage law on freedom of contract
grounds); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (same for federal minimum
wage law).
244. See Young, supra note 877, at 1736 ("Much of the Federalism debate has centered on
textual and historical sources. But it seems fair to say that although those sources of law have
been highly relevant to the Court's enterprise, neither text nor history has dictated many of the
resulting doctrines.").
245. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. art. X.

246. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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derives from "the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court," which "reserve[] [to the
' 24 7 It
states] a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty."
is this residual state sovereignty, a concept that is not derived solely
from the text, that the Court has relied upon to find that the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I do not include the power to
either subject nonconsenting states to suit in state or federal courts or
248
commandeer state officials to enforce federal law.
As John Manning has observed, this tendency to engage in
"structural inference" has created a category of unenumerated states'
rights that is significantly broader and more potent than Congress's
Article I powers and extends beyond the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments. These unenumerated states' rights are usually tied to
some federalism value, such as protecting state sovereignty, that the
Court deems important enough to warrant looking beyond the text
and tapping into a residual sovereignty left to the states. 249 The
Court's recent federalism decisions look past the contested statutes'
semantic meanings and rely on multiple constitutional provisions in
order to reinstate the federalism balance that, in the Court's view, the
framers intended. 250 The failure to point to a textual source for its
conclusions, according to Manning, makes the Court's new
purposivism in its federalism cases illegitimate. 2 1 Indeed, the fact

247. Id. at 713-14.
248. See cases cited supra notes 177 and 225. Some commentators thought that the Supreme
Court curtailed judicially enforced federalism with its decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), holding that Congress did not exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause in passing
the Controlled Substances Act, which forbid the use of homegrown marijuana even if such use
was allowed by state law. See e.g., Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalismas a Casualty of the
War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 507, 508 (2006) (arguing that the decision is wrong
on textual and structural grounds). However, decisions following Raich illustrate that the Court
is still very much willing to enforce these limits, especially in the context of the VRA.
249. See Manning, supra note 240, at 2036 (noting that the Alden Court, in finding states
immune from suit, "invoked the overall tenor of the many constitutional clauses that presume
the 'continued existence' and 'vital role' of the states").
250. See id. at 2006 ("This technique, a form of structural inference, identifies numerous
discrete provisions that, in particular ways, divide sovereign power between state and federal
governments and, in so doing, preserve a measure of state autonomy. Taking all of those
provisions together, the Court ascribes to the document as a whole a general purpose to preserve
a significant element of state sovereignty."); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
n.3 (1995) (espousing the general rule that "[u]nder our federal system, the States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law") (internal citation omitted).
251. See Manning, supra note 240, at 2049; id. at 2051 ("Whatever indeterminacy marks
provisions such as the General Welfare Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the balance of Section 8 leaves little doubt that the drafters and adopters of
Article I established a system of enumerated powers and made rather specific judgments about
what constituted appropriate matters of federal concern.") (internal citation omitted). But see
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that federalism is a political construct with unclear lines makes the
notion of a free-floating, judicially enforced federalism norm
dangerous for the area of voting rights. 252 The Court, for example, can
easily rely on the changed racial environment as evidence that the
statute's current implementation is no longer consistent with its
original purpose and therefore unjustifiably undermines the original
state/federal balance of the Constitution, even if this balance is
253
nonexistent.
A decentralization analysis, however, would defer to Congress's
determination of both the scope of the VRA and the proposed
remedy. 254 The denial of sovereignty to the states justifies deference
255
toward legislative judgments in the form of rational basis review.
Instead, the Court has gone in the opposite direction, employing a type

Gillian Metzger, The ConstitutionalLegitimacy of FreestandingFederalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F.
98, 101 (2009), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/
ForumVol_122_metzger.pdf (arguing that because the Constitution has broad and ambiguous
language, the founders likely intended that there be a general federalism norm).
252. Cf.

EDWARD

A.

PURCELL

JR.,

ORIGINALISM,

FEDERALISM,

AND

THE

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 34 (2007) (position of some founders before ratification with
regards to whether the Constitution supported a strong central government changed postratification); Charlton C. Copeland, Ex Parte Young: Sovereignty, Immunity, and the
Constitutional Structure of American Federalism; 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 843, 872 (2009) (rejecting
the notion that allocating regulatory authority between the state and the federal government is
the sole way of ensuring fidelity to our federal structure in part because of the impossibility of
determining the right balance that accurately reflects the duality of American federalism).
253. Cf. Manning, supra note 240, at 2024-25 ('[The Court has evidently concluded that, if
modern Commerce Clause doctrine threatens its minimum conception of state sovereignty, it will
handle the problem by recognizing implied limitations in federal power that are traceable to
some form of historically reconstructed original understanding of the appropriate federal -state
balance."). But see id. at 2046 (noting that the Court's actions are problematic because the
Constitution operates at different levels of generality and "[e]nforcing the spirit rather than the
letter of a document devalues the fundamental decision to design the bargaining process a
particular way. ... [T]he stakeholding states (through their delegates) exercised their allocated
voting power to adopt a document that, in many respects, divided power between the state and
federal sovereigns rather precisely.").
254. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 80-81 C'[D]ecentralization, a centrally
established strategy that favors transfers of authority from centralized to subsidiary units for
specific purposes, fits perfectly with fiscal federalism's goal of allocating authority among levels
of government in the most efficient manner.").
255. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV.
87, 107 (2001) (noting that in the time prior to Boerne, "[tihe rationality standard [] provided the
framework for reviewing the basis of congressional action"); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith,
Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary
Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1755 (2002) (arguing that the Court's requirement of due
legislative deliberation is untenable); see also Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 144 (2001); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 796 (1996) (arguing that areas of exclusive state power are a
necessary condition of a system of constitutional federalism and attempting to identify those).
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of freestanding federalism that protects state sovereignty to a greater
degree than previously.
2. The Federalism Norm and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
The free-floating federalism norm poses the most problems for
section 5 of the VRA, which requires states to preclear any change to
their election laws before the change can go into effect. Critics of
section 5 initially relied on a somewhat boundless notion of federalism
in challenging the provision. In South Carolinav. Katzenbach, which
upheld the constitutionality of section 5,256 Justice Black argued in
dissent that
by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their
policies, so [section 5] distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render
drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost
any distinction
257
meaningless.

Justice Black viewed the provision as not only violating the
constitutional structure, but also as inconsistent with the original
258
meaning of the Constitution.
Similarly, Justice Powell, in City of Rome, argued in dissent
that section 5's "encroachment [on state sovereignty] is especially
troubling because it destroys local control of the means of selfgovernment, one of the central values of our polity," and "it strips
locally elected officials of their autonomy to chart policy. ' 25 9 Thus, the

256. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) ("As against the reserved
powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting."); id. at 313-15 (observing that case-by-case
litigation against voting discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, has
not appreciably increased Negro registration and that voting suits have been onerous to prepare,
protracted, and where successful have often been followed by a shift in discriminatory devices,
defiance or evasion of court orders"); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176
(1980) ("[L]egislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be
upheld so long as the Court could find that the enactment 'is plainly adapted to [the] end' of
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and 'is not prohibited by but is consistent with the letter
and spirit of the [C]onstitution,' regardless of whether the practices outlawed by Congress in
themselves violated the Equal Protection Clause.") (internal citations omitted).
257. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
258. Id. at 360-361; see also Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (forcing a state to submit its legislation for advanced review is incompatible with our
constitutional structure, a state of affairs made worse because it applies to only a few states).
259. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 201-02 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Georgia, 411 U.S. at
543 (White, J., dissenting) ("Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since been upheld, it
remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must submit its legislation to federal authorities
before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the
burden of proof as to constitutionality simply because the State has employed a particular test or
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focus on values without any tie to the text, as in Gregory,260 also
purports to act as some constraint on congressional power in this
context. 26 1 More recently, Justice Thomas criticized section 5 on
federalism grounds, noting that "the section's interference with state
sovereignty is quite drastic-covered States and political subdivisions
may not give effect to their policy choices affecting voting without first
262
obtaining the Federal Government's approval."
The NAMUDNO Court has taken up the mantle, relying on
structure and history in protecting state sovereignty from the broad
provisions of section 5. NAMUDNO, although ostensibly upholding
section 5 through questionable statutory interpretation, contains
strong language that warns Congress about the costs that the
provision imposes on the states, suggesting that the Court might later

invalidate

it.263

However, the Court's analysis is flawed for several

reasons. First, the structure of section 5 and its allocation of power
between the states and the federal government reflect the
decentralized nature of our system of elections. Section 5, according to
the Court, "goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment
by suspending all changes to state election law-however innocuousuntil they have been precleared by federal authorities in Washington,
D.C." 264 As Professors Feeney and Rubin have noted, however, "in
decentralization, in contrast to federalism, the central government
identifies the [most efficient] result and thus defines the criteria for
success or failure."265 The Court has upheld the constitutionality of
section 5 in the past for the reason articulated by these scholars: that
it was the most efficient and effective way for Congress to address a

device and a sufficiently low percentage of its citizens have voted in its elections.") (internal
citation omitted).
260. 501 U.S. 452, 458-61 (1991) (discussing the numerous benefits of a federalist system
and concluding that "[ijf Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute" (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989))).
261. See PURCELL, supra note 251, at 23-24 (describing that judges and commentators often
invoked "the so-called values of federalism . . . to limit national power"); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1543-45 (1998) (arguing
that the Court uses clear statement rules in order to enforce values such as state autonomy at
the expense of individual rights).
262. Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
263. See Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) (noting that
the coverage formula is based on evidence that is over thirty-five years old and does not address
the reality that "the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States originally
covered by § 5 than it is nationwide").
264. Id. at 2511-12 (noting that "preclearance requirements in one State would be
unconstitutional in another").
265. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 21.
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problem that had defied resolution in the past through piecemeal
66
legislation.
Second, although the states are similarly situated sovereigns,
as the NAMUDNO Court argues, they are not sovereign over Congress
with respect to elections. And with decentralized regimes, "the central
government decides how decisionmaking authority will be divided
between itself and the geographical subunits." 267 The Court's decisions
have, at times, reflected that the states are less powerful than
Congress in this area. Recall that in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,268 the Court found the states' power to choose the time,
place, and manner of elections is not broader than Congress's power to
make or alter such provisions. 269 In fact, the Thornton Court limited
the states' electoral authority to regulate procedure, a determination
that stands in opposition to the Roberts Court's arguments that
federal intervention into state electoral schemes undermines
2 70
substantive policy preferences.
The Roberts Court makes an error by viewing Congress's power
to pass section 5 as limited to Congress's remedial authority under the
Fifteenth Amendment and ignoring that the Elections Clause gives
Congress broad authority over state electoral schemes more generally.
As the sovereign authority, Congress has significant room to craft a
regulatory regime that achieves the goals and values that are the aims
of the policy. But the Court has erroneously focused on the ways in
which section 5 prevents states from maintaining their local
preferences, which is ironic given that the Court's case law has made
it exceedingly unlikely that section 5 will prevent a jurisdiction's
271
voting laws from going into effect.

266. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) ("The Act intentionally confines
these remedies to a small number of States and political subdivisions which in most instances
were familiar to Congress by name. . . . Congress had learned that substantial voting
discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of the country, and it knew no way of
accurately forecasting whether the evil might spread elsewhere in the future. In acceptable
legislative fashion, Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where
immediate action seemed necessary.").
267. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 10, at 21.
268. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
269. 514 U.S. 779, 832 (1995) (arguing that if Congress cannot add qualifications to its
members, then states also cannot under the guise of exercising their power to regulate the time,
place, and manner of elections).
270. Id. at 834-35 ("Our cases interpreting state power under the Elections Clause reflect
the same understanding. The Elections Clause gives States authority 'to enact the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to
enforce the fundamental right involved.'" (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932))).
271. As Nathaniel Persily and Jennifer Rosenberg recently pointed out, "[cloverage, by itself,
which is the source of the complaint in NAMUDNO, only raises federalism concerns if
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In Reno v. Bossier ParishSchool Board, for example, the Court
held that the Attorney General could not deny preclearance under
section 5 for a plan that was nonretrogressive, even if the proposed
27 2
changes were discriminatory and violated section 2 of the Act.

Moreover, the Court limited the section 5 inquiry to the search for
retrogressive, as opposed to discriminatory, intent. 273 As Michael Pitts
has argued, the Bossier Parish cases represent the Court's attempt to
limit the substantive reach of section 5 by curbing the federal
274
government's ability to deny preclearance to state voting practices.
The Bossier Parishcases reflect the Court's misunderstanding about
the scope and nature of congressional authority to effectuate the goals
of the VRA.
Thus, the Court's unfavorable treatment of section 5 of the
VRA is unsurprising given this emerging view in its jurisprudence of
state sovereignty as lying not only within the contours of the text but
also in the Constitution's structure and history. 275 Given the explicit

jurisdictions have a legitimate fear that their voting laws will not be allowed to go into effect."
Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and
Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law
Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1678 (2009).
272. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (BossierParish1),520 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1997).
273. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320, 335-36 (2000)
(reinstating the rule that the presence of any discriminatory purpose is grounds for denying
preclearance).
274. Michael J. Pitts, What Will the Life of Riley v. Kennedy Mean for Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act?, 68 MD. L. REV. 481, 520-21 (2009) ('In the 1990s, the Attorney General had
prevented the implementation of many voting changes solely because the changes had been
adopted with a discriminatory purpose; in the early 2000s [after Bossier Parish I & II], the
Attorney General prevented the implementation of only a few changes solely because the
changes were adopted with a discriminatory purpose.") (internal citation omitted); see also
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 96 (1997) (holding that the benchmark for comparing whether a
new plan is retrogressive is the previous plan that had been in effect, a holding that resulted in
older plans with less minority representation serving as the benchmark for retrogression);
Halberstam, supra note 34, at 954-55 ("Section 5 does not go beyond what is substantively
already required of states and localities. To the contrary, in making preclearance decisions, the
DOJ was forced to tolerate unconstitutional and, under Bossier Parish II, even intentional
discrimination, so long as it did not make minorities worse off. Section 5, as the Supreme Court
has stated on several occasions, is therefore less burdensome than the Constitution itself.")
(internal citations omitted).
275. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (developing a clear statement rule
requiring Congress to announce its intent to preempt state law without relying on a specific
textual provision in the Constitution); see also Manning, supra note 240, at 2031 ("[T]he Court
abstracted from the specific enumeration of powers in Article I a general purpose of 'federalism'
that is both broader and more potent than the enumeration from which it is derived. However
sensible Gregory's particular limitation on federal interference with state judicial tenure may
seem when imagining the contours of a dual sovereignty, the fact remains that the Court rested
its authority on the abstraction of a freestanding federalism found nowhere in the text.")
(internal citations omitted).
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textual commitment that states determine the time, place, and
manner of elections, at least in the first instance, the concerns of
Justices Powell and Black, although they did not carry the day forty
years ago, have manifested themselves in recent years as the
federalism concerns allegedly raised by the Act have become more
276
salient.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court conflates state autonomy with state
sovereignty in the context of the VRA, in effect promoting the dualist
undertones that characterize much of its federalism case law and
giving the states significantly more power over elections than they
otherwise would have. Its voting rights jurisprudence presupposes
that the states still retain a large amount of "sovereignty" over
elections, leaving room for the Court to characterize the federal/state
relationship over elections as one of shared power instead of viewing
the state as subordinate to federal authority. The view of electoral
authority as "shared" has led the Court to defer more to the states
over the matter of elections. 2 77 This deference is due in part to the
misconception that placing meaningful limits on congressional
authority extends to all federalism issues, including those issues such
as elections, which are not truly "federalist" in nature but instead
reflect a decentralized system of authority.
This focus on sovereignty-with special emphasis on the state
side of the equation-has raised concerns that judges have become illsuited to implement far-reaching civil rights legislation, mostly
276. For further discussion, see Persily, supra note 30, at 117 ("That measure [Section 5]
stands alone in American history in its alteration of authority between the federal government
and the states and the unique procedures it requires of states and localities that want to change
their laws. No other statute applies only to a subset of the country and requires covered states
and localities to get permission from the federal government before implementing a certain type
of law.") and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands
of A Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 125, 134 (2010) ("In asking select
states and local jurisdictions to preclear any and all changes to their voting laws, section 5
essentially places these jurisdictions in a status akin to a receivership. To critics, this bears an
unmistakable resemblance to Reconstruction."); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 210-11 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Rome [by maintaining an at-large
election system] has not engaged in constitutionally prohibited conduct" and "prohibition of these
changes can[not] genuinely be characterized as a remedial exercise of congressional enforcement
powers" and effectively gives Congress "the power to determine for itself that this conduct
violates the Constitution").
277. For a recent example, see Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam) (finding
that a district court, in drawing interim redistricting plans, should defer to the State's recently
enacted plans even if those plans have not been precleared as required under section 5 of the
VRA and are being challenged under section 2 of the provision).
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because their concerns about reigning in federal authority and ceding
power to the states have trumped issues of individual rights. Indeed,
the presence of a free-floating federalism norm can raise the
evidentiary threshold so high that Congress could never amass
enough evidence of voting discrimination to justify the renewal of
section 5 or develop a coverage formula that would allay the
federalism concerns raised by the NAMUDNO Court.
In reality, Congress's power under the Elections Clause and its
power to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments ensure the constitutionality of the VRA. Consequently,
the Court should employ rational basis review of the legislative record
of the VRA for any new constitutional challenges going forward.

